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THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN
CORPORATION: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REFORM IN CONTEXT
Charles R. T. O'Kelley*
This Article traces the evolution of the modern corporation from
the American Civil War to the present. I begin with a focus on the pe-
riod from 1865 to the Great Depression. This was the era of the
Great Tycoon, the time of the second industrial revolution and the
transformation of America's economy from small proprietorships
and partnerships to the forerunner of the modern corporation. I then
detail the transformational crisis of the Great Depression and Adolf
Berle's central role in shaping America's changed understanding of
the proper relationship between government and the modern corpora-
tion. It was Berle, both as a scholar and key advisor to Franklin
Roosevelt, who recast America's history so that the New Deal seemed
a natural extension of individualism. The following Part details the
period encompassing the New Deal and the Second World War. It is
this period in which the United States develops into a modern,
Keynesian social democracy. It is this period when the United States,
in partnership with the modern corporation, assumes the mantle of
world hegemon. I then examine the modern corporation during the
heyday of American hegemony and the so-called "golden age of
American capitalism;" the period runs roughly from 1950 to 1973 and
is characterized by the Galbraithian Corporation, with power de-
volved to the technocracy of the firm. I conclude with tentative intui-
tions as to the nature of the modern corporation and the CEO in re-
cent times. The tentativeness of this final section is purposive. We are
too close in time to the "present" to agree on what has transpired,
much less what is about to transpire. Thus, my effort is to provide a
common backdrop for understanding the slightly more distant past,
in hopes that conversation about the near present and near future will
be more fruitful.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The nature of the modern corporation has preoccupied scholars for
more than a century. The seminal scholars-Thorstein Veblen, Adolf
Berle, and John Kenneth Galbraith in particular-understood that the
nature of the modern corporation is evolutionary, rooted in the past but
changing along with the fortunes of men and nations. Following in that
tradition, and placing special emphasis on the work, thoughts, and in-
sights of Adolf Berle, this Article sketches an evolutionary account of the
modern corporation from the American Civil War to the present. Cen-
tral to my account is technological progress in the means of production-
the first, second, and third industrial revolutions-and the effect of that
progress on business organization and society. Necessarily, the story I
tell places the entrepreneur and the CEO at the center of the evolving
modern corporation, and the modern corporation at the center of the ris-
ing American empire. My story "ends" with some uncertainty as to
where we are, or where we are going, as any account of the present must.
Still, perhaps counter to the intuitions of many, I conclude that the cur-
rent-day CEO's power has likely not diminished in recent years despite
the corporate governance reforms of the past decade.
Writing in 1932, Adolf Berle identified the ascendancy of the mod-
ern corporation, and its rulers-the Princes of Industry.' Berle' painted a
stark picture. Collectively, a few hundred of these corporations had tak-
en ownership of a substantial portion of America's industrial assets.' The
trend seemed clear and unstoppable. Within a few decades, the produc-
tive assets in every important sector of the economy would be owned by
these increasingly large and powerful corporations. 4 An equally im-
portant trend was the ever-increasing dispersal of voting control from the
hands of entrepreneurs/managers into the hands of the investing public.
The result was a new normal-separation of ownership and control. In
most large corporations, majority voting power was now in the hands of
passive, geographically dispersed shareholders with no ability or incen-
tive to challenge insiders' control.' As a result, the Princes of Industry-
CEOs, investment bankers, and other representatives of great fortunes-
could and did use the levers of corporate power as they chose, maintain-
ing each other in corporate offices and in control of corporate boards of
directors.6
1. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 2 (1932) (describing how concentration of power "has brought forth princes of industry").
2. Berle is generally recognized as the primary author of The Modern Corporation. See Charles
R.T. O'Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1141, 1141 n.2 (2010).
3. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 33.
4. Id. at 18-46.
5. Id. at 47-125.
6. Id. at 3, 124.
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Beginning after Enron,7 the corporate governance landscape ap-
peared to change fairly dramatically. Marcel Kahan and Ed Rock pro-
vide a useful summary of these changes in their 2010 article, Embattled
CEOs.' The changing nature of corporate share ownership calls into
question the traditional depiction of shareholders as passive, dispersed,
and powerless. A majority, and steadily increasing, portion of corporate
voting stock is owned by a decreasing number of institutional investors.
Assisted by ever more muscular proxy advisory firms and aggressive
hedge funds, institutional investors threaten to make shareholder activ-
ism the new normal.9 Changes in governance rules have removed insid-
er-controlled defenses to proxy contests; chief among these changes are
the decline of staggered boards, the ascendancy of majority voting for the
election of directors, and the successful-shareholder-proposal phenome-
non.10 Regulatory changes have impacted shareholders' access to the
company proxy and the balance of power in the proxy solicitation pro-
cess." Legislation and related listing rule changes have resulted in the
insider-dominated board becoming a dinosaur: the new norm is boards
composed primarily of independent directors. 2 Finally, Kahan and Rock
point to efforts to rein in executive compensation, including "say on pay"
initiatives and enhanced compensation disclosure requirements."
Kahan and Rock conclude:
The story we tell above is a story of declining CEO power over
the last several years, a decline that has occurred across almost all of
the relevant dimensions and that we believe will last and contin-
ue....
[W]e argue that the balance of power between CEOs, boards,
and shareholders has shifted notably in the last decade away from
CEOs towards outside directors and shareholders. If, as we expect,
that shift will continue in the same direction, CEOs are left ever
more embattled, at least in comparison to their predecessors a gener-
ation ago."
If Kahan and Rock are correct in their intuition (and they admit
that it is an intuition)," then an evolutionary story of the modern corpo-
7. The phrase "after Enron" refers to the 2001, accounting-fraud-induced collapse and bank-
ruptcy of the Enron Corporation and the numerous other corporate account scandals uncovered at
around the same time. For a summary of these events, see David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law
After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61,64-68 (2003).
8. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEx. L. REV. 987 (2010).
9. Id. at 995-1007.
10. Id. at 1007-13.
11. Id. at 1013-22.
12. Id. at 1022-32.
13. Id. at 1033-37.
14. Id. at 1051 (emphases added).
15. Kahan and Rock are unusually candid in acknowledging the tentativeness of their conclu-
sions:
The intuition that drives this Article is nicely captured in Milo Winter's famous 1912 illustration
of Gulliver tied down by the Lilliputians.... [Numerous] complications make our analysis
somewhat conjectural. Maybe we are completely wrong that CEO power has declined. Maybe
CEOs are every bit as powerful as they once were. Maybe they were never very powerful. Or
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ration from Berle's time to the present would seem to emerge. While the
battle has been long and slow, the modern corporation and the Princes of
Industry are finally being brought under shareholder and independent
director control. CEOs are losing power. Boards are no longer domi-
nated by insiders.
When I read an early draft of Kahan and Rocks's article, one claim
struck me as odd. They claim that CEOs are losing power "at least in
comparison to their predecessors a generation ago." 6 As evidence of how
powerful CEOs were a generation ago, Kahan and Rock point to the pic-
ture of director impotence and CEO power painted by Myles Mace in his
1971 book, Directors: Myth and Reality.17 Mace's work drew on inter-
views with directors and officers conducted from 1969 to 1971.18 Relying
solely on Mace's work for the proposition that CEOs were much more
powerful "a generation ago" struck me as problematic given John Ken-
neth Galbraith's concurrent, negative, assessment of CEO power, set out
in The New Industrial State.19
Kahan and Rock quoted the following interview excerpts from
Mace's account:
To put it bluntly, whether a board has any function or not, it
must truly reflect the nature of the chief executive officer of the
company more than anything else. If he wants to use the board, he
will use them. And if he doesn't want to use the board, he will run
over them pretty roughshod. Basically, the board can be made just
about as useful as the president wishes it to be.
The president of a company, or the chairman of the board, or
whoever runs this operation, really determines the contribution the
board makes. If all he wants to do is to get up in front of them and
sort of go through some motions, see that fees get distributed, give
them a bit of lunch-then that's the kind of performance you will
get, because the chief executive officer controls the affair. If, on the
other hand, the chief executive officer seeks out where in the man-
agement areas various board members might be able to make more
of a contribution than in others, and then structures his board so
that emphasis is placed on such questions rather than on the rote al-
ternative, then the chief executive is making a direct impact on the
contribution the board makes. This, I suppose, is a matter of style.
. . .The old man [the president] has exactly the kind of a board
he wants. They all live here in the city, and they just don't do a
damn thing as directors. The old man thinks it is a great board, and
maybe it is impossible to come up with a metric for measuring CEO power or, even if one can de-
sign a metric, to collect the data to determine whether CEO power has declined. On the other
hand, we think that there are lots of reasons to think that one can intelligibly discuss CEO power,
that it has declined, and that this decline has important implications.
Id. at 990, 994-95.
16. Id. at 1051 (emphasis added).
17. MYLES L. MACE, DIREcrORS: MYTH AND REALITY 178-206 (1971).
18. Id. at v-vii.
19. JoHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 46-59 (1967).
[Vol. 20131004
No. 3] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN CONTEXT
from his point of view he is probably right. From my point of view
they are a big glob of nothing. Not that there aren't some extreme-
ly able outsiders on the board-there are. But as board members,
they know who is in control and they will never cross the old
man....
What any new board member finds out very quickly in our
company is that it is very difficult to do anything except go along
with the recommendations of the president. Because directors who
don't go along with them tend to find themselves asked to leave.2 0
Kahan and Rock then quote the conclusion Mace drew from his exten-
sive interviews:
Presidents of these [widely held] companies have assumed and
do exercise the de facto powers of control of the companies for
which they are responsible. To them the stockholders constitute
what is in effect an anonymous mass of paper faces. Thus, presi-
dents in these situations determine what directors do or do not do."
From their reading of Mace, Kahan and Rock conclude that the late
1960s CEO (the CEO of a long generation ago)22 was powerful because
unshackled. Since the CEO of today appears increasingly shackled, then
the 1960s CEO must be the more powerful of the two.
The problem is that Kahan and Rock's conclusion that the 1960s
CEO was all-powerful, or at least powerful in comparison to the present-
day CEO, does not square with John Kenneth Galbraith's observations
as set out in The New Industrial State.23  As Galbraith notes, the mantle
of the all-powerful, entrepreneurial CEO was still often claimed by the
1960s CEO, but the reality was far different. The mature 1960s corpora-
tions had become far too complex for entrepreneurial direction. Instead,
control devolved to the technostructure within the firm. The modern
(1960s) reality was not risk-taking and swashbuckling leadership by indi-
vidualistic CEOs. Rather, planning and collective decision making by
experts was the key to survival and success. 2 4 The picture Galbraith
painted is not a pretty sight.
In romance the past greatly improves on the present. In the
history of almost every industry, there has been a famous and some-
times flamboyant entrepreneur. Like the tank commander, the
20. Kahan & Rock, supra note 8 at 991-92 (citing Mace, supra note 17, at 78-79) (omissions and
punctuation in original).
21. Id. at 992 (citing Mace, supra note 17 at 84) (alteration in original).
22. Kahan and Rock are using as their comparative temporal unit a "long generation"-that is, a
period of time that covers a somewhat longer period than what we normally mean by a generation.
Similarly, Giovanni Arrighi developed and used the term "long century" to refer to periods of more
than 100 years that normally bracket a particular cycle of capitalist hegemony. See GIOVANNI
ARRIGHI, THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY: MONEY, POWER, AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIMEs 6-7
(1994) ("[Cjonsecutive systemic cycles of accumulation overlap, and although they become progres-
sively shorter in duration, they all last longer than a century: hence the notion of the 'long century,'
which will be taken as the basic temporal unit in the analysis of world-scale processes of capital accu-
mulation.").
23. GALBRAITH, supra note 19, at 49-50.
24. Id. at 60-71.
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head of the modern enterprise, in which all important actions are
studiously considered by committees, all contingencies carefully an-
ticipated and all adverse ones either prevented or negated, seeks to
see himself in an earlier and more heroic image. Doubtless this
does no harm. Additionally his function is to lend dignity and an
aspect of power to stockholders' and directors' meetings, and other
business ceremonials; to salute customers and clients of equal or
greater dignity; to give the equivalent of the royal assent to agree-
ments, contracts and indentures; to represent the enterprise in its
more honorific relations with government; to act as an emissary to
liberal learning; and to affirm, on appropriate public occasions,
faith in free enterprise, the social responsibility of business and the
continuing relevance of ancestral virtues. For all these rites the
mantle of Carnegie, Rockefeller or Henry Ford is more than a little
helpful.25
Much of Galbraith's book explains why the 1960s CEO looks noth-
ing like the Princes of Industry so central to Berle's depiction of the
modern corporation. However, in keeping with his dry sense of humor,26
he offers as ultimate evidence what happened to the CEO upon his re-
tirement. Galbraith first notes that some men are critically important to
an organization's success, while others owe their status to the organiza-
tion.27 The 1960s CEOs fall into the latter category. When a CEO re-
tired, the markets did not blink.28 The financier understood that "retire-
ment, death and replacement, however important for the individual
involved, have not the slightest effect on General Motors or Continental
Can. Power, it is implicitly recognized, has passed to the technostruc-
ture."29 But the impact on the retired CEO in that era was drastic:
Following the final flight in the company jet, there will be only
an honorific association with the board of directors and sometimes
not that. His memoirs will not be in demand; the United Fund will
want a man more affirmatively identified with affairs; his only con-
tinuing public responsibilities will be in his own church; his name
will not again appear in the papers until the day following his death.
The great entrepreneur lived out his last days disposing of his
wealth or resisting those who sought to have him do so. The mod-
ern executive does not have enough money so to occupy himself.
Such is his recessional. 0
25. Id. at 93.
26. Michael Stewart, Obituary: JK Galbraith, GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2006), http://www.guardian.
co.uk/news/2006/may/01/guardianobituaries.usa ("His irony and wit were persistently deployed against
the absurdities of the monetarist doctrines of Milton Friedman, and Arthur Laffer's notion that cutting
income tax on the rich would increase government revenue.... He was fond, too, of characterising
the trickle-down economics of the Reagan-Bush era as advocating feeding the horse more oats be-
cause some would pass through to the road for the sparrows.").
27. GALBRAITH, supra note 19, at 96.
28. Id. at 94-95.
29. Id. at 95.
30. Id. at 97.
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What are we to make of this very different account of the 1960s
CEO? The starting point for me was the discovery that Mace cited both
Adolf Berle and John Kenneth Galbraith with approval, '31 suggesting that
Mace's account and understanding of the 1960s CEO was intended to
supplement and not conflict with the seminal work of either of these
great scholars. Ultimately, my effort to reconcile the work of these au-
thors and to understand the relationship between times past and times
present led me to a different intuition than that reached by Kahan and
Rock.
Though my intuition-that CEO power has not diminished-is the
opposite of what Kahan and Rock conclude, that difference is not the
principal focus of the story I will tell. They may well be right, and others
are better equipped than me to parse the details of recent changes that
they so carefully describe. Instead, I will focus on providing an evolu-
tionary account of the modern corporation from the real onset of the in-
dustrial revolution in the United States to the long generation ago which
Mace and Galbraith describe. My goal is to provide a different backdrop
or perspective against which to judge, as best we can, what the nature of
the present really is. In other words, I want to help set the stage for a
better writing of a legal history of the present.3 2
There are many ways this story could be told. I, however, will spin
it with central reference to the work, thoughts, and insights of Adolf
Berle, who foreshadowed much of Galbraith's work.33  Fortunately for
our generation of corporate law scholars, Berle fused his commanding
understanding of corporate law and practice with his keen understand-
ing of history." It was Berle, writing on the eve of the New Deal, who
provided policy makers then and now with the central metaphor of the
modern corporation-the separation of ownership and control. 6 It was
Berle writing in the early 1930s who, drawing on the work of other great
scholars including particularly Thorstein Veblen, described how the
modern corporation had evolved from our country's founding to the New
31. MACE, supra note 17, at 74-75.
32. I have in mind a version of what George Kennan called "history of the present." See
TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, HISTORY OF THE PRESENT: ESSAYS, SKETCHES, AND DISPATCHES FROM
EUROPE IN THE 1990s, at xiv-xviii (1999).
33. Reading in the same sitting Adolph A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1965) and THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE, GALBRAITH, supra note 19, one sees that
Galbraith's thinking is deeply intertwined with and influenced by Berle's critique of the modern cor-
poration and laissez-faire individualism, and that Berle and Galbraith similarly understand the mature
modern corporation of the 1960s.
. 34. Berle's unique expertise in the intricacies of corporate law are reflected in the fact that in
1930 he created the first Corporate Finance casebook. Boris I. Bittker, Review: Cases and Materials on
the Law of Business Organizations (Corporations) by Adolf A. Berle and William C. Warren, 57 YALE
L. J. 1443, 1443 (1948).
35. Had Berle followed his intellectual passion, rather than the demands of his father and the
broader dictates of his talent, he would have been a historian rather than corporate lawyer, scholar,
and influential public intellectual. See JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE
VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 13-14 (1987).
36. Id. at 52; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Or-
igins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 105 (2008).
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Deal." It was Berle who understood the further evolution of the modem
corporation from the New Deal until the late 1960s. And it was Berle
who foresaw how the modern corporation might evolve from then to
now. 38
I will trace the evolution of the modern corporation from the Civil
War to the present as follows: Part II focuses on the period from 1865 to
the Great Depression. This was the era of the Great Tycoon, the time of
the second industrial revolution, and the transformation of America's
economy from small proprietorships and partnerships to the forerunner
of the modern corporation. Part III details the transformational crisis of
the Great Depression and Adolf Berle's central role in shaping Ameri-
ca's changed understanding of the proper relationship between govern-
ment and the modern corporation. It was Berle, both as a scholar and
key advisor to Franklin Roosevelt, who recast America's history so that
the New Deal seemed a natural extension of individualism.39 Part IV de-
tails the period encompassing the New Deal and the Second World War.
It is this period in which the United States developed into a modern,
Keynesian social democracy.40 It is this period when the United States, in
partnership with the modern corporation, assumed the mantle of world
hegemon.4 1 Part V examines the modern corporation during the heyday
of American hegemony and the so-called "golden age of capitalism;" the
period runs roughly from 1950 to 1973 and is characterized by the Gal-
braithian corporation, with power devolved to the technocracy of the
firm.42 Finally, in Part VI, I share some tentative intuitions as to the na-
ture of the modern corporation and the CEO in recent times. I suggest
that CEOs' motivations are now much more pecuniary and entrepre-
neurial in nature than the CEOs of the Galbraithian era, and that CEO
power is not in decline.
II. THE RISE OF THE MODERN CORPORATION-AMERICA FROM 1865
TO THE GREAT DEPRESSION
A. The Civil War to World War I
In 1865, America emerged from the Civil War as a nation intact, but
still dwarfed economically and otherwise by the British Empire. The first
industrial revolution, fueled by steam power and cotton, had reached its
peak, and Great Britain ruled the world that revolution had made possi-
37. SCHWARZ, supra note 35, at 56; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 36, at 111-12.
38. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 36, at 148; Marc T. Moore & Antoine Reb6rioux, Cor-
porate Power in the Public Eye: Reassessing the Implications of Berle's Public Consensus Theory, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1109, 1134-35 (2010); Charles R.T. O'Kelley, Berle and Veblen: An Intellectual
Connection, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1317, 1317-18 (2011).
39. See infra Part III.B.2.
40. See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
42. See infra Part IV.D.
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ble. British manufacturers were the world's most efficient, British citi-
zens were the world's most affluent, and British merchant fleets were the
world's transport system.43 Viewed from Britain, America appeared as
merely a cog in the Empire's global wheel. William Stanley Jevons, the
eminent English economist, described the scene:
The plains of North America and Russia are our cornfields;
Chicago and Odessa our granaries; Canada and the Baltic are our
timber forests; Australasia contains our sheep farms, and in Argen-
tina and on the western prairies of North America are our herds of
oxen; Peru sends her silver, and the gold of South Africa and Aus-
tralia flows to London; the Hindus and the Chinese grow tea for us,
and our coffee, sugar and spice plantations are all in the Indies.
Spain and France are our vineyards and the Mediterranean our
fruit garden, and our cotton grounds, which for long have occupied
the Southern United States, are now being extended everywhere in
the warm regions of the earth.44
This view of America masked the emerging reality. A mere four
decades later, America would eclipse Great Britain in economic power."5
This changing of the guard occurred as soon as it did because of the dev-
astating effects on Great Britain of World War I.46 But by then, the
change was inevitable and, indeed, almost complete. America had de-
veloped a uniquely efficient new business form-the modern corpora-
tion. Sitting astride these powerful economic entities were America's
great entrepreneurs and financiers. Nothing could stem the modern cor-
poration's swift rise to dominance, and, for a time, no reward seemed too
great for the modern corporation's rulers-the Princes of Industry. The
birth and ascendancy of the modern corporation resulted from the con-
fluence of the second industrial revolution, the American Civil War, the
bounteous American internal consumer market, and the unique Ameri-
can entrepreneurial response to the shortcomings of competitive mar-
kets.47
Around 1850, the Western world began to encounter a new stage of
the industrial revolution. The exact onset of this new era-the second
industrial revolution-is impossible to date with precision; it arrived in
different places at different times.4 8 In the period between 1850 and
1875, however, the material conditions of industrial life changed dramat-
ically. Prior to 1850, the nature of industry was little changed from what
had been present at the outset of the industrial revolution:
43. PAUL KENNEDY, PREPARING FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 8-9 (1993).
44. Id. at 9 (quoting William Stanley Jevons).
45. E.J. HOBSBAWM, INDUSTRY AND EMPIRE: FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT DAY 156-59 (New
Press 1999) (1968).
46. Id. at 128-29.
47. ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 299-304.
48. Thorstein Veblen equated the beginning point of the industrial revolution with the end of
the era of free competition. See O'Kelley, supra note 38, at 1337-38.
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Electricity, petroleum and rubber had no share in industry
then, and even that extensive use of structural iron and steel that
has characterized the later age was still in its beginnings. Industrial
chemistry was but a slight and inconspicuous matter, and the indus-
trial uses of the rarer metals were still unknown.4 9
By 1875, structural iron and steel, rubber, rare metals, and products
from industrial chemistry, joined with new energy sources-petroleum
and electricity-to totally transform the industrial system, paving the way
for the assembly line and mass production of consumer and capital
goods." The old ways of manufacturing were swept away, unable to
compete with the new processes and materials."
The Civil War paved the way for the American economic ascendan-
cy. After Waterloo, the world enjoyed one hundred years of relative
peace with the tragic exception of the American bloodbath.52 The Civil
War's cost in treasure and human lives and suffering was something the
world did not see again until World War I." Just as the Napoleonic Wars
had helped propel Britain to world leadership during the first industrial
revolution,5 4 however, the Civil War had a profoundly positive impact on
the development of the American economy during the second industrial
revolution."
The Civil War exposed the governments of both North and South to
unprecedented financial demands. While the South largely was forced to
meet this challenge by printing fiat money, the North was able to raise a
significant portion of its war budget via private borrowing in the form of
bond sales to the public." The proceeds of these private securities issu-
ances in large measure were then passed on to business firms aiding the
war effort in one way or another. Government money poured into rail-
roads, gun foundries, iron mills, and manufacturers of shoes and cloth-
ing." As the profits of those firms soared, so too did investors' interest in
acquiring corporate securities. Due to the huge increase in bond and se-
curities trading, Wall Street profited enormously from the war. 8 By the
49. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES:
THE CASE OF AMERICA 74 (Viking Press 1964) (1923).
50. HOBSBAWM, supra note 45, at 150-56.
51. Or as Veblen put it: "The industrial system, the state of the industrial arts, as it stood before
that date was complete without these things; since that time, since their invention has made them nec-
essary, industry can not do without these things ..... VEBLEN, supra note 49, at 74.
52. ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1914-1991, at 22-23
(Vintage Books 1996) (1994) ("In 1914 there had been no major war for a century, that is to say, a war
in which all, or even a majority of, major powers had been involved .... Much the longest of [the few
major wars] was not an international conflict but a civil war within the U.S.A. (1861-65).").
53. JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN EMPIRE OF WEALTH: THE EPIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN
ECONOMIC POWER 191-94 (2004) ("The total military deaths in the war on both sides-officially
498,333-exceeded 3 percent of the American male population in 1860, four and a half times our per-
centage losses in World War II.").
54. ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 258-61.
55. Id. at 281; CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TYCOONS 11 (2005).
56. GORDON, supra note 53, at 194.
57. Id. at 199.
58. Id.
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war's end, Wall Street had developed an expertise and credibility second
only to London as a financial center, and that status was cemented in the
ensuing decade with the creation and rise of the New York Stock Ex-
change and the related evolution of a workable system for private polic-
ing of the securities issuance process.59 American business could now tap
not only foreign lenders and investors, but also an increasingly large sum
of home-grown capital made available through the auspices of a sophis-
ticated coterie of American investment bankers.
Post-Civil War America was thirsty for growth. America's influx of
immigrants provided both a steady stream of new labor and new con-
sumers. 61 The immense untamed expanses of the American West cried
out for new rail and telegraph lines. 62 The new and expanding cities cried
out for new homes, and more food, and more clothing.63 This virtuous
circle fueled a feverish expansion of existing businesses, and the search
for new and more efficient industrial processes and products."6
Into the rapidly expanding post-Civil War economy stepped ambi-
tious, forceful, intelligent, fearless men-Andrew Carnegie, John D.
Rockefeller, Jay Gould, and J.P. Morgan-slated to be known as the
Great Tycoons, along with a host of fellow capitalists, all competing for
wealth, power, and respect." Unlike the situation facing the British busi-
ness elite as the second industrial revolution unfolded, 66 American busi-
nessmen had a nearly clean canvas on which to paint, and a nearly unlim-
ited set of colors from which to choose.
Carnegie, Rockefeller, Gould, and Morgan would have been
dominant figures anywhere, but few places have ever been as open
to people of talent as post-Civil War America; and in America, no
field offered opportunities as unlimited as business. America's rad-
59. Id.
60. The war also changed the mindset of the American public toward investing. Before the war,
private savings were almost entirely held outside the banking system. After the war, not only bank
deposits but investment in securities became increasingly common for middle class Americans. Id. at
193.
61. Id. at 244.
62. Id. at 217.
63. MORRIS, supra note 55, at 166, 169-70; Arthur M. Schlesinger, The City in American History,
27 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REv. 43, 56-59 (1940).
64. GORDON, supra note 53, at 200-205.
65. Charles R. Morris summarizes:
Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, Jay Gould, and John Pierpont Morgan were all in their
late twenties or early thirties, all on the first rungs of their careers, in the waning days of the Civil
War. In an age of outsized business leaders, no others played so great a role in shaping and chan-
neling the American boom. They forced the pace, drove the transition to ever larger scales, and,
for good or ill, imposed personal stamps on the national economy that persisted well into the
twentieth century.
MORRIS, supra note 55, at xii.
66. ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 283-92, 291 ("[The] highly extroverted, decentralized, and differ-
entiated structure of British business constituted a major obstacle for its corporate reorganization
along German or US lines. Not only did it make horizontal combinations in restraint of competition
difficult . . . but, in addition, it prevented British business from seizing opportunities to cut unit costs
through a closer planning and integration of the sequential activities into which processes of produc-
tion and exchange were divided .... ").
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ically different manufacturing culture, its cult of the innovative en-
trepreneur, its obsession with "getting ahead" even on the part of
ordinary people, its enthusiasm for the new-the new tool, the new
consumer product-were all unique.67
America's business tycoons played a key role in the nation's rapid
ascendance. They sought business advantage in a rapidly changing polit-
ical and economic environment, dealing with corruption, uncertain legal
institutions, and intense competition, along with the vagaries of rapidly
evolving technologies.6 8 These were Knightian entrepreneurs, drawn by
the spirit of the greatest game known to man.69 Uncertainty was the Ty-
coons' friend and enemy, but above all, the reason for their power and
wealth. These Tycoons took the greatest business risks man had ever en-
countered, sometimes losing, but more often winning. Always, however,
and each in his own way, they battled uncertainty.
Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Gould tapped into the national
predilection for speed, the obsession with "moving ahead," the tol-
erance for experimentalism, to create one of history's purest labora-
tories of creative destruction. Most businessmen of the time be-
lieved in orderly markets and gentlemanly fair profits, but these
three came with flaming swords. Morgan [the great financier] was
the regulator, always on the side of reining in "ruinous competi-
tion," most especially of the kind regularly unleashed by the other
three.0
As the last quarter of the nineteenth century unfolded, U.S. busi-
nessmen were battered by competition with each other, and, equally im-
portantly, competition from Great Britain. This intense, cutthroat strug-
gle greatly increased uncertainty. Prices ebbed and flowed. Consumer
demand waxed and waned. Businessmen struggled to match supply to
demand. Profit margins were thin or nonexistent, making firms depend-
67. MORRIS, supra note 55, at xiii.
68. GORDON, supra note 53, at 205-28.
69. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (Midway Reprint ed. 1985) (1921) is
the seminal account of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is the captain of the business ship who
determines what course to take and assumes the risk of failure. For Knight, the truest form of entre-
preneurship is the sole proprietorship, where ownership and control are united; in that form the pow-
er and responsibility to make business decisions is joined with residual claimant status -the right to all
profits and the responsibility for all losses. See Charles R.T. O'Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the The-
ory of the Modern Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 766-67 (2006). Knight believed, however, that the
entrepreneur would be motivated by his competitive spirit, even if the rewards of the venture were not
solely his:
For it is clear that the "personal" interests which our rich and powerful business men work so
hard to promote are not personal interests at all . . . .The real motive is the desire to excel, to win
at a game, the biggest and most fascinating game yet invented, not excepting even statecraft and
war.
KNIGHT, supra, at 360.
70. MORRIS, supra note 55, at xii-xiii ("They were quite different people. Carnegie, Rockefeller
and Gould tapped into the national predilection for speed, the obsession with 'moving ahead,' the tol-
erance for experimentalism, to create one of history's purest laboratories of creative destruction....
Morgan, the most traditional figure of the four, was the one American whom overseas financiers trust-
ed.").
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ent on lenders and investors for working capital needs." Indeed, the pe-
riod from 1873 to 1896 was experienced, at least by businessmen in
America, as a period of sustained price deflation for which natural forces
seemed to provide no answer. 72
America and Britain both entered this period with an economy
dominated by "family capitalism," small- to medium-sized firms with a
relatively small number of "partners."7  Britain's economy remained so
structured. Britain's competitive advantage was as the dominant middle
man in an integrated, trade-based, international economy.74 Britain
needed to buy raw materials at the lowest possible price in world markets
and then sell its finished products at the best price possible. Even if prof-
it margins were squeezed at times, British firms on average did far better
than their international competitors.75  As a result, British capitalists re-
sisted innovation. Rather than plow profits into restructuring British in-
dustries, they invested surplus profits internationally, thereby staking
enormous British claims to the future profits of foreign nations. 76 As
Halford Mackinder noted in 1899, Britain's resulting control of world
capital reinforced and was central to Britain's control of international
markets."
[T]he world's clearing house tends, from its very nature, to
remain in the single position, and that clearing house will always be
where there is the greatest ownership of capital. This gives the real
key to the struggle between our free trade policy and the protection
of other countries-we are essentially the people with capital, and
those who have capital always share in the activity of brains and
muscles of other countries."
Captive to the needs of this international system, British firms re-
mained small, nimble, and "family" in structure.79
In America, this status quo quickly grew intolerable. While all
Americans benefited as consumers from the low prices that unfettered
71. ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 296-97.
72. Id. at 167.
73. Id. at 266-67. Even if these firms were incorporated for liability limitation purposes, the
shareholders were close associates and thought of themselves as partners. See MORRIS, supra note 55,
at 135-36.
74. Giovanni Arrighi describes Britain's dominant middle man role as follows:
"[I]f by market we understand the place where demand and supply meet, then Britain was the
world market since its governmental and business institutions were the chief intermediaries be-
tween the producers and the consumers of the world. The more intensely the producers (con-
sumers) of the world competed for markets (supplies), the greater were the options open to Brit-
ish business to substitute sources of supply (markets) for one another, and hence the greater its
power to control the world market."
ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 289.
75. Id. at 293-94.
76. Id. at 270.
77. Id. at 294-95.
78. Id. at 285 (quoting PETER J. HUGILL, WORLD TRADE SINCE 1431: GEOGRAPHY,
TECHNOLOGY, AND CAPITALISM 305 (1993)).
79. Id. at 282.
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competition produced, the producers of these products saw only disad-
vantage.
By the mid-1890s, in the midst of the third long depression in
three successive decades, a revulsion against the unregulated mar-
ket spread among the bourgeoisie in all major sectors of the econ-
omy. Whatever their programmatic differences, farmers, manufac-
turers, bankers, and merchants, in addition to already disenchanted
railway capitalists, found a common ground in the idea that unregu-
lated competitive market activity resulted in production of goods
and services in excess of effective demand at prices that returned
reasonable earnings to producers of normal efficiency. The watch-
word was "overproduction.""
The American counter-movement against the evils of overproduc-
tion coalesced in two extremes-the Populists and the Corporatists. The
Populists saw the answer in even greater adherence to the ideal of com-
petitive markets. In other words, the Populists sought to restore "a just
market, defined as one that sustained the natural right of the small pro-
ducer to remain an independent agent in the market."81 The Corporatists
thought the answer lay in bringing markets under the control of big busi-
ness. Where the Populists fought against business combinations and saw
big as bad, the Corporatists saw overproduction as a natural consequence
of industrial development under conditions of intense market competi-
tion.82 America's Great Tycoons, of course, saw big as good.
While the debate between Populists and Corporatists would contin-
ue in the arenas of politics and academics well into the twentieth century,
U.S. capitalists knew from direct experience that overproduction was an
evil to be overcome, and, further, knew that cutthroat competition was
the root cause. "By the 1890s, their complaints that overproduction was
destroying profit and causing depressions had become legion."83 By then,
however, American business had begun to experiment with a variety of
solutions to the problem.
As John Kenneth Galbraith later described, with the increasing
complexity of industry brought on by the second industrial revolution,
competitive markets could no longer be relied upon to organize business
activity.
In the market economy the price that is offered is counted up-
on to produce the result that is sought. Nothing more need be
done. The consumer, by his offer to pay, obtains the necessary re-
sponding action by the firm that supplies his needs. By offering to
pay yet more he gets more. And the firm, in its turn, by similar of-
fers gets the labor, materials and equipment that it requires for
production.
80. MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-
1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS 53-54 (1988).
81. Id. at 54.
82. Id. at 55.
83. Id
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Planning exists because this process has ceased to be reliable.
Technology, with its companion commitment of time and capital,
means that the needs of the consumer must be anticipated-by
months or years. When the distant day arrives the consumer's will-
ingness to buy may well be lacking. By the same token, while
common labor and carbon steel will be forthcoming in response to a
promise to pay, the specialized skills and arcane materials required
by advanced technology cannot similarly be counted upon. The
needed action in both instances is evident: in addition to deciding
what the consumer will want and will pay, the firm must take every
feasible step to see that what it decides to produce is wanted by the
consumer at a remunerative price. And it must see that the labor,
materials and equipment that it needs will be available at a cost
consistent with the price it will receive. It must exercise control
over what is sold. It must exercise control over what is supplied. It
must replace the market with planning."
The Great Tycoons were at the forefront in both causing the "over-
production problem" and in finding a solution to it.t? In the early years
after the Civil War it was these and similar men whose innovations had
led to tremendous productivity gains, huge increases in total output, and
steadily falling prices.86 Likewise it was these innovative entrepreneurs
who later embraced horizontal and vertical integration and the creation
of large business firms with increasingly sophisticated internal manage-
ment bureaucracies in order to avoid market transactions as much as
possible and ensure desired levels of profits.87
The great American entrepreneur instinctively understood that size
in and of itself provides protection from uncertainty. And, under the
persistent tutelage of powerful financier J.P. Morgan, they came to un-
derstand how to translate size into protection from the dictates of unfet-
tered market competition.8
John Kenneth Galbraith later provided a theoretical explanation of
how "bigness" and "cooperation" worked together to tame the market.
Larger firms that retained earnings as a cushion could withstand market
shocks that would destroy smaller firms." Moreover, larger firms had
greater ability to substitute planning for the uncertainties flowing from
market determination of price and supply. This could be done by sus-
pending, controlling, or superseding the market." Large size equated to
both power and reliability. A promise from Carnegie Steel Company
84. GALBRArTH, supra note 19, at 23-24.
85. MORRIS, supra note 55, at 106-18.
86. Id. at 102-03. Output increased dramatically across the economy. Id. at 102-06. Perhaps the
most striking and important increase was in steel. "America had no steel production to speak of in
1870, but was neck and neck with Great Britain by the early 1880s." Id. at 102. By 1899 "the Carnegie
Steel Company alone would outproduce Britain." GORDON, supra note 53, at 248.
87. See MORRIS, supra note 55, at 239.
88. See id. at xiii.
89. GALBRAffH, supra note 19, at 31-33.
90. Id. at 27.
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could be relied upon to a great extent, whereas a promise from a small
proprietorship was subject to substantial worry as to whether the propri-
etor could be trusted or would be able to perform as promised.' Thus,
large firms could enter into long-term contracts with each other stipulat-
ing prices, amounts, and procedures for adjustment when unexpected
contingencies warranted. Thus, Galbraith notes, "In a world of large
firms, it follows, there can be a matrix of contracts by which each firm
eliminates market uncertainty for other firms and, in turn, gives to them
some of its own."' The large firm can also control the market vis-A-vis
smaller firms by virtue of its market share. Smaller firms must take the
price that the market offers. "Not so with [the larger firm]. Its decision
to buy or not to buy will usually be very important to its suppliers; it may
be a matter of survival. This induces a highly cooperative posture."93 Fi-
nally, U.S. firms learned how to suppress the market via vertical integra-
tion-taking within themselves sub-processes that previously had been
undertaken by independent suppliers. "As viewed by the firm, elimina-
tion of a market converts an external negotiation and hence a partially or
wholly uncontrollable decision to a matter for purely internal decision." 94
America presented its entrepreneurs with a unique geographic ad-
vantage in growing larger firms. To a greater extent than other coun-
tries, the United States had within its borders everything that a business
needed.
The larger and more populous the economic territory, [other
things being equal] the larger the individual plant can be, the lower
the costs of production, and the greater the degree of specialization
within the plant, which also reduces costs of production. The larger
the economic territory, the more easily can industry be located
where the natural conditions are most favourable and the produc-
tivity of labour is highest. The more extensive the territory, the
more diversified is production and the more probable it is that the
various branches of production will complement one another and
that transport costs on imports from abroad will be saved.95
During the 1870s and 1880s, businessmen sought to suppress the
market primarily through cartels and trade associations." This strategy
did not survive the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, enacted in 1890.9" One path remained open. "After 1899 law-
yers were advising their corporate clients to abandon all agreements or
91. Id. at 30-31.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 29.
94. Id. at 28.
95. RUDOLF HILFERDING, FINANCE CAPITAL: A STUDY OF THE LATEST PHASE OF CAPITALIST
DEVELOPMENT 311 (Tom Bottomore ed., Morris Watnick & Sam Gordon trans., 1981).
96. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 316-17 (1977).
97. Id. at 331-33.
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alliances carried out through cartels or trade associations and to consoli-
date into single, legally defined enterprises."98
As instructed, American entrepreneurs embraced vertical integra-
tion with fervor. From 1899 to 1901, a flurry of merger activity occurred,
the likes of which would not be seen again until the 1960s." With the
creation of the United States Steel Company in 1901, the contours of the
modern corporation were firmly in place. The next thirty years would
simply witness the unfolding of this design.
The merger flurry that ushered in the twentieth century allowed a
very small number of firms in each industrial sector to substitute internal
decision making for the uncertainties of the market. These modern cor-
porations were made up of numerous processes and sub-processes that
could be, and often had been, conducted by separate and autonomous
small firms." The integrated firm then substituted internal, administra-
tive decision making for the market transactions that occur between sep-
arate firms. As Alfred Chandler observed, internalization produces sav-
ings only if an effective internal decision-making organization exists.''
Central to the success of the modern corporation was the creation of
such systems.
[The advantages of vertical integration] could be achieved on-
ly when a group of managers had been assembled to carry out the
functions formerly handled by price and market mechanisms.
Whereas the activities of single-unit traditional enterprises were
monitored and coordinated by market mechanisms, the producing
and distributing units within a modern business enterprise are mon-
itored and coordinated by middle managers. Top managers, in ad-
dition to evaluating and coordinating the work of middle managers,
took the place of the market in allocating resources for future pro-
duction and distribution. In order to carry out these functions, the
managers had to invent new practices and procedures which in time
became standard operating methods in managing American pro-
duction and distribution."
The advantages of vertical integration produced a self-reinforcing
feedback loop. Successful management innovations produced surplus
cash flows that were plowed back into further improving internal pro-
cesses. The result was the rapid hegemonic rise of the modern, multi-
unit business firm.03 "Almost nonexistent at the end of the 1870s, these
integrated enterprises came to dominate many of the nation's most vital
industries within less than three decades."10* At the same time, these
98. Id. at 333. In addition to Supreme Court interpretation of the Sherman Act, vertical integra-
tion was further encouraged when New Jersey "modernized" its corporation laws to allow direct cor-
porate ownership of out-of-state property. See Gordon, supra note 53, at 258-59.
99. MORRIS, supra note 55, at 252.
100. CHANDLER, supra note 96, at 50-121.
101. See id. at 7.
102. Id.
103. ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 239.
104. CHANDLER, supra note 96, at 285.
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modern firms used the advantages gleaned in conquering U.S. markets to
compete abroad. "U.S. corporations began to move to foreign countries
almost as soon as they had completed their continent-wide integra-
tion.... In becoming national firms, U.S. corporations learned how to
become international.""o' By the coming of the first World War, Ameri-
can entrepreneurs were poised to benefit from the horror to be visited
disproportionately on citizens of other lands.
B. World War I
Similar to the Civil War, World War I provided U.S. business with
an enormous stimulus. Both Great Britain and Germany lost access to
export markets, which turned instead to U.S. products. 06 Great Britain
could no longer obtain supplies from many of its key suppliers and, in
any event, needed to focus its production on war supplies."' Those needs
could not be met with internal production. American industry was the
primary beneficiary of this disruption. 0
Markets in Latin America and Asia, which had been served by
European companies, were now open to be taken over by Ameri-
can firms. Far more important was the avalanche of orders that be-
gan to roll in to American firms from Great Britain and its allies,
for steel, vehicles, railroad rolling stock, and rails....
Munitions, of course, were in the greatest demand by the Brit-
ish, French, and Italian militaries. Du Pont had been only a
midsized manufacturer of gunpowder before the war, but would
come to supply the Allies with fully 40 percent of their munitions.
In the four years of the war, Du Pont's military business increased
by a factor of 276. And it became one of the world's largest chemi-
cal companies as well. Germany had dominated the world's chemi-
cal industry in the decades before the war, but it lost its export
market with the Royal Navy's blockade. Du Pont and other Amer-
ican chemical companies quickly seized that vast market. By the
end of the war, Du Pont had annual revenues twenty-six times as
large as they had been in 1913....
Overall, the gross national product of the United States in-
creased by 21 percent in the four years of the war, while manufac-
turing increased by 25 percent.'*
World War I accelerated the end of British world dominance. Be-
fore the war the United States was heavily indebted to Great Britain. 0
After the war, Great Britain was substantially in debt to the United
105. Stephen Hymer, The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development, in
ECONOMICS AND WORLD ORDER FROM THE 1970's TO THE 1990's, at 113, 121 (Jagdish N. Bagwhati
ed., 1972).
106. See GORDON, supra note 53, at 288.
107. See id. at 286-89.
108. Id. at 286.
109. Id. at 288-89.
110. Id. at 293.
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States."' Worse for Great Britain, its substantial loans to Russia could
not be collected due to the Communist takeover."2 The U.S. dollar
joined the British pound as a world reserve currency."3 While Britain
was still powerful, its economy had been far surpassed by the U.S. econ-
omy, and the transfer of world hegemony was now unstoppable.114
For the United States' rapidly growing large firms, World War I was
a godsend. Not only did it provide a Civil-War-like laboratory in which
to further refine industrial, marketing, and sales processes and further
develop internal bureaucracies for efficient, authoritarian resource man-
agement, war also paved the way for widespread public investment in the
modern corporation's stocks and securities."' In 1915, the Dow Jones
Industrial Average experienced its largest percentage gain in history."'
The huge inflow in capital was coming from Americans investing their
surplus income. At the same time, Britain and France were liquidating
their U.S. investments to help finance the war."' The U.S. government
and investors emerged from the war in control of the largest store of
world capital."'
C. The Roaring Twenties
The decade following World War I-the Roaring Twenties-was a
period of unprecedented wealth creation."' At the decade's center were
the modern corporation and its managers. In basic concept, the modern
corporation was fully mature by 1920. But there was much still to unfold
before that maturity was fully realized in practice. During the decade,
the great American corporations established ever greater control over
their own enterprises and over the possibilities available to U.S. labor
and capital.'20 The changes they wrought in themselves and the U.S.
economy were hidden in plain sight, at least until the coming of the
Great Depression.
America's possible replacement of Great Britain as global hegemon
seemed possible in large part because of the modern corporation. Dur-
ing the 1920s, American firms prospered at the expense of foreign firms,
111. Id.
112. See ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 271.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. GORDON, supra note 53, at 288-89.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 290.
118. ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 279.
119. There was a brief but deep recession in 1920-1921. See CHRISTOPHER Dow, MAJOR
RECESSIONS: BRITAIN AND THE WORLD, 1920-1995, at 146-57 (1998). And, of course, the Great De-
pression traces its onset to the stock market crash that began in late October, 1929. See ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER: 1919-1933, at 157
(1957).
120. A.A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, Corporations and the Public Investor, 20 AMER. ECON.
REV. 54,56-57 (1930).
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and Americans and American firms replaced the British as leading ac-
cumulators of foreign capital.121
Throughout the 1920s productivity continued to grow faster in
the United States than in any of the debtor countries, further in-
creasing the competitive edge of US business and the difficulties of
debtor countries to service, let alone repay, their debts. And as the
dependence of the world's payments system on the US dollar in-
creased, the United States acquired foreign assets "with a rapidity .
. . which ... is unparalleled in the experience of any major creditor
nation in modern times." 122
In a sense, the great industrial firms were merely working out the
blueprint inherent in what we call the second industrial revolution. As
U.S. industries continued to innovate, the publicly visible result was a
rich array of new consumer products at what appeared to be constantly
falling prices.
Natural resources were readily available and cheap. Standard-
ization and the techniques of mass production pioneered by Henry
Ford allowed large companies to lower manufacturing costs and to
sell their goods to an expanding market. The success of Ford and
the automotive industry in general had a domino effect on other in-
dustries; many other companies took up Ford's policy of high wages
and low prices, with work compartmentalized for increased effi-
ciency.123
Along with this readily apparent enhancement in consumer goods at
increasingly favorable prices came a revolutionary change in the nature
of personal savings. The ordinary American experienced this as the dec-
ade's great romance with the stock market. Initial public offerings in-
creased threefold from 1923 to 1927.124 Sales in the secondary trading
markets increased fourfold from 1923 to 1928.125 Shares traded on the
New York Stock Exchange rose in market value by almost 250% be-
tween 1925 and 1929.126 For those who had savings, the stock market
seemed the only place to put it.
This stock market boom accelerated the final stage in the construc-
tion of the modern corporation. As Adolf Berle first documented, the
twenties saw a rapid shift in the control of both U.S. productive assets
and U.S. dominant business enterprises.127 By decade's end, U.S. indus-
try was dominated by a handful of truly giant corporations, and a few
hundred very large ones.128
121. ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 281.
122. Id. at 273 (quoting MAURICE DOBB, STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM 332
(1963) (omissions in original)).
123. TOM STREISSGUTH, THE ROARING TWENTIES 276 (rev. ed. 2007).
124. SCHLESINGER, supra note 119, at 68.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 18-19, 32-34.
128. Id. at 32.
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The size of the modern giant corporation is difficult to
grasp.... On the basis of assets, the American Telephone and Tel-
egraph Company would be equivalent to over 8,000 average sized
corporations, and both the United States Steel Company and the
Pennsylvania Railroad Company to over 4,000.... [T]he two hun-
dred largest non-banking corporations . . . [had] combined assets
[that] amounted to . . . nearly half of all corporate wealth in the
United States . . . [and] roughly 22 per cent of the total wealth of
the country. 12 9
This concentration of wealth in the giant corporations had been oc-
curring rapidly during the 1920s, with approximately one-sixth of produc-
tive property shifting from individual to corporate ownership during the
last seven years of the decade. Berle correctly predicted that the trend
would continue indefinitely. 0
Equally important to the final maturation of the modern corpora-
tion was the dispersion of stock ownership and the resulting separation
of ownership and control. As Berle documented, most of the giant cor-
porations were controlled by managers who owned far less than a majori-
ty of the company's stock."' Theoretical voting control was dispersed
among tens of thousands of passive investors who had no interest in or
practical ability to participate in corporate management or the election
of directors. Shareholders, if they bothered to vote at all, merely rubber-
stamped the slate of directors nominated by the board itself.'32
As Berle powerfully described, the modern corporation had now
conquered the product and labor markets in every respect, and its man-
agers-Berle's Princes of Industry-had conquered the market for cor-
porate control supposedly residing in the annual election contest to be
decided by a majority of the corporation's shareholders.' So long as the
United States held to laissez-faire policies, the Princes of Industry would
unilaterally determine how the gains from industry were distributed be-
tween and among themselves, shareholders, workers, and society as a
whole.
The results of the roaring twenties demonstrated that without gov-
ernment intervention, the Princes of Industry and the shareholders (pre-
dominantly rentiers) would take a disproportionate share of the gains
from industry. Though the economy prospered, and Americans in gen-
eral benefited, the modern corporations and their managers fared even
better. "Through the decade, profits rose over 80 per cent as a whole, or
129. Id. at 18-19,31.
130. Berle, supra note 33, at 3-4 ("My co-author, V.E. Pederson and I estimated that in a single
decade (1922-1932) more than one-sixth of the entire national wealth had shifted from individual
hands into managerial-that is, corporate -hands, and we suggested that at that rate forty years would
see the wealth of the entire country split, most of it being operated by corporate management ... .
131. Id. at 2.
132. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 81 ("The normal apathy of the small stockholder is such
that he will either fail to return his proxy, or will sign on the dotted line, returning his proxy to the of-
fice of the corporation.").
133. Id. at 2, 124.
1021
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
twice as much as productivity; the profits of financial institutions rose a
fantastic 150 per cent."l34
The incomes of managers and rentier shareholders' reflected this
success. From 1920 to 1929, the share of national income going to the
top one percent of Americans rose from 14.5% to almost 20%.136 The
CEOs of top American corporations were clearly in that group. While
we do not have comprehensive data on CEO income relative to the aver-
age worker, we do know that incomes were substantial and at levels not
to be seen again even in nominal terms until the 1960s.1'1 In 1929, Eu-
gene Grace, President of Bethlehem Steel, received total compensation
of $1,623,753, the equivalent of $21,920,665 in 2012 dollars.138  In the
same year, John Ryan, Chairman of the Board of Anaconda Copper, was
paid $300,000, the equivalent of $4,050,000 in 2012 dollars.'39
As the 1920s roared to a close, the modern U.S. corporation and its
managers sat at the pinnacle of the most powerful economy in the world.
In two generations since the Civil War, the Great Tycoons and their suc-
cessors had created the modern corporation, an economic engine of un-
paralleled efficiency. The modern corporation had conquered the mar-
ket. Its managers determined what was bought and sold and at what
prices. The U.S. President, Herbert Hoover, himself a self-made man
and a wealthy former engineer and entrepreneur, was running the coun-
try on sound business principles.'40 The future looked bright indeed for
the modern corporation and its managers as the twenties roared to a
close.
134. SCHLESINGER, supra note 119, at 66.
135. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States: 1913-1998, 118 Q.
J. ECON. 1, 17 (2003).
136. Id. at 12 fig.2.
137. See Harwell Wells, "No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year": The Fight over Executive
Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REv. 689, 690 (2010) ("[A] series of disclosures re-
vealed that executives at some of the nation's largest corporations had made huge sums in the years
immediately before the Great Crash. A few executives even earned the then-unthinkable sum of $1
million a year....").
138. ROBERT HESSEN, STEEL TITAN: THE LIFE OF CHARLES M. SCHWAB 270 (1975). Calcula-
tions are based on the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank yearly CPI calculator, comparing 1929 to
2012. See Consumer Price Index, FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS, http://www.minneapolisfed.org/
community-education/teacher/calc/histl9l3.cfm (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).
139. BERNARD J. REIS, FALSE SECURITY: THE BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN INVESTOR 22
(1937).
140. SCHLESINGER, supra note 119, at 77-89.
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III. THE GREAT DEPRESSION-THE IMPETUS FOR CHANGE
A. Overview
After World War I, the United States surpassed Great Britain eco-
nomically, but not in terms of what we now call "soft power."141 Britain
still had the monetary and banking leadership of the world via its central
bank and related institutions. Its political institutions and bureaucracies
dwarfed those of the still quite lean U.S. government. And its business
organizations were still much more tightly connected with political actors
in consciously pursuing British interests.'42 The Great Depression ex-
posed the shortcomings of U.S. monetary and governmental institutions,
and starkly illuminated the need for a new relationship between govern-
ment and the modern corporation. These needs, however, had a larger
international context. British world hegemony was now clearly over, but
a new hegemon was not yet in place. If the United States was to assume
that role, it would need to escape the limiting, and now thoroughly dis-
credited, tendrils of laissez-faire individualism. The Great Depression
provided the necessary "shock," and the 1932 election campaign provid-
ed the political crucible for beginning that transition.
B. Refrarning the Relationship Between Government and the Modern
Corporation
1. Darkness
In the aftermath of the stock market crash of October 1929, the
United States rapidly descended into the Great Depression. At first,
government and business leaders assumed that a turnaround would natu-
rally occur with only mild government nostrums required.143 But this de-
pression was different than the doldrums the country had experienced
periodically in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. This
time ordinary people suffered terribly as compared to business. 4  The
great modern corporations were no longer subject to market control.
Rather than suffer lower profits, the modern corporations cut wages, re-
duced production, and laid off workers.145 The modern corporations got
141. The term "soft power" refers to the non-coercive or non-military mechanisms that enable a
nation to accomplish its political and economic ends. Joseph Nye coined the term in 1990 and has
been responsible for its development into an internationally recognized concept. For his account of
the evolution of the concept, and the misunderstanding which its use sometimes generates, see JOSEPH
S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, at ix-xiii (2004).
142. ARRIGHI,sutpra note 22, at 298-99,302-04.
143. SCHLESINGER, supra note 119, at 177-80.
144. See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, A HISTORY OF MONEY AND BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES:
THE COLONIAL ERA TO WORLD WAR II, at 161-65 (2002); CHANDLER, supra note 96, at 316-317.
145. SCHLESINGER, supra note 119, at 249-51 ("The Year 1932 brought new anguish. By spring,
when United States Steel made its second large wage slash, the attempt to maintain pay scales had
pretty well foundered.").
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leaner but retained full functionality and the ability to make a profit.46
Many Americans, adults and children, got leaner, much leaner, in body
and in spirit. There was no work and no way to put food on the table.47
"Faith in life itself seemed to be ebbing away: the national birthrate for
1931 was 17 per cent below 1921 and 10 per cent below 1926."148
The Great Depression was a tremendous shock to the American
psyche. It caused even conservative businessmen to understand at a vis-
ceral level that fundamental change was necessary-or else. As the de-
pression deepened, Daniel Willard, long-time president of the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad, was representative of this emerging consensus:
Throughout his seventy years he had never questioned the
capitalist order. Yet a system that denied millions of men work and
relief, he had come to feel, could not "be said to be perfect or even
satisfactory." The problems of unemployment and the distribution
of wealth were forcing him to doubt "the very foundations of our
political and economic system." For himself, he continued, "I would
steal before I would starve."'49
The presidential campaign of 1932 was fought over which vision
would govern the United States going forward-the long dominant lais-
sez-faire individualism or a different model of corporate capitalism.
Some progressives leaned towards socialism or communism. 0 Others
hewed to the old populist dream-a world in which there were no "big"
businesses and the market magically produced a just society.'"' Herbert
Hoover staked his political future on maintaining the status quo.152 But
the bulk of progressives and mainstream policy makers circled around a
new relationship between government and the modern corporation that
better served the public and the nation.153 And Franklin Roosevelt, cau-
tiously, placed his chips on the side of a more assertive role for govern-
ment, particularly in its relationship with the modern corporation.154
Roosevelt's bet was the winner.
146. Id. at 249-51.
147. The following is a small excerpt from Arthur Schlesinger's wrenching account:
The Philadelphia Community Council described its situation in July 1932 as one of "slow starva-
tion and progressive disintegration of family life." In the Pennsylvania coal fields, miners kept up
a subdued battle against starvation, freezing in rickety one-room houses, subsisting on wild weed-
roots and dandelions, struggling for life in black and blasted valleys. In Kentucky ... wan children
attended school without coats, shoes or underclothes.
Id. at 250.
148. Id. at 251.
149. Id. at 180-81.
150. Id. at 204-23, 435-36.
151. See id. at 418-19; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS
OF UPHEAVAL 234 (1960) (stating that in Justice Brandeis's view, "bigness was always badness").
152. SCHLESINGER, supra note 119, at 295-96.
153. See id. at 423.
154. Id. at 422-34.
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2. Reimagining Individualism- Berle and the American Narrative
The reshaping of the U.S. relationship with the modern corporation
followed the ideological blueprint and reimagining of America articulat-
ed by Adolf Berle."' Berle was the perfect person for the task. With the
passing of Thorstein Veblen, Berle had become the public intellectual
with the widest and deepest understanding of history, corporation law,
economics, and politics. And, unlike Veblen, Berle was not a cynic. He
saw his task not as demolishing the existing institutions, but in building
on them.'56 Moreover, unlike Veblen, Berle was at the right place at the
right time. In 1930, he published a law review article detailing research
into the nature of the modern corporation.' This report, along with ear-
lier law review articles written by Berle, transmuted into Berle's seminal
work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, published first in
1931, and then republished in 1932.158 In it, Berle detailed the fundamen-
tal nature of the modern corporation, and the unfettered power that sep-
aration of ownership and control bestowed on corporate managers-the
Princes of Industry."9 The book was received by progressive policy mak-
ers, hungry for ammunition in the coming fight to reshape America, as a
rich source book of near biblical significance.16o
In 1932, Berle was drawn into Franklin Roosevelt's campaign in
large measure because of this visionary work on the modern corporation.
Behind the scenes, Berle and a handful of other public intellectuals and
leaders fought to shape the vision that Roosevelt would take to the
American people and that would form the framework for his first admin-
istration.16 ' Berle found in Roosevelt a receptive ear. Though not an in-
tellectual himself,62 Roosevelt understood the need for a positive fram-
ing of the coming changes, and Berle offered an intellectual but
pragmatic vision.'63
On August 15, 1932, Berle proposed that Roosevelt deliver a major
address tackling head-on Hoover's insistent harping on the theme of "in-
dividualism."'" Berle had in mind an address that would help define a
core difference between Hoover and Roosevelt. Hoover conflated "in-
dividualism" with the continuance of a laissez-faire relationship between
155. Particularly in his seminal work, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY and
in the important campaign speech, "The New Individualism," one of Roosevelt's greatest speeches.
156. O'Kelley, supra note 2, at 1156-57.
157. Berle & Means, supra note 120.
158. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 36, at 105-22.
159. Id. at 120.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 109-10.
162. SCHLESINGER, supra note 119, at 407-09 ("His intellectual processes had always been intui-
tive rather than logical. He often thought lazily and superficially.").
163. Id. at 426-27 ("[T]he Commonwealth Club address provided impressive reasons for enlarg-
ing the role of government. For Roosevelt, who was more interested in results than in systems, this
was probably more important than the basic framework of interpretation.").
164. Davis W. Houck, FDR's Commonwealth Club Address: Redefining Individualism, Adjudicat-
ing Greatness, 7 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 259,265-66 (2004).
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government and the modern corporation.16' Berle wanted Roosevelt to
expose Hoover and develop a new understanding: the individual cannot
prosper unless the modern corporation is brought to heel. Roosevelt
concurred. 16
On the night of September 22, 1932, Roosevelt received Berle's fi-
nal draft; it was Roosevelt's first look at the speech. "He read it over,
made a few slight corrections, and that was that."' The following day, at
noon, Roosevelt delivered "his" famous speech to the Commonwealth
Club in San Francisco.' Later it would be heralded as one of the twen-
tieth century's greatest addresses,16 9 a result that could be seen as unde-
served.' True, the speech attracted less immediate attention when de-
livered than other of Roosevelt's major campaign addresses."' True, the
academic points represented Berle's intellect more than Roosevelt's."'
Detractors, however miss the larger point. The speech' 3 represents the
view of the modern corporation and its relation to government and socie-
ty that would prevail for the next forty years.
Berle correctly saw the modern corporation as an amazingly pro-
ductive engine, but he saw the remnants of the Great Tycoons' control as
a now totally useless, indeed destructive, appendage. With his historian's
eye, he pulled together a grand narrative that honored the past and reaf-
firmed America's commitment to individualism, but a new individualism
grounded in an active partnership between the modern corporation and
government. It was a story of the ebb and flow of recurrent themes. It
was a story running from the United States of America's European roots,
through its founding, and into its future.'74
The first recurrent theme was society's periodic need for "[men] of
ruthless force."' Berle described Europe's transition from feudalism
and the establishment of the Americas' colonies as a fight for individual
freedom and security in which men of ruthless force played the lead
role.'76
When we look about us, we are likely to forget how hard peo-
ple have worked to win the privilege of government. The growth of
the national governments of Europe was a struggle for the devel-
165. Id. at 266.
166. Id. at 266-67.
167. Id. at 262 (quoting Raymond Moley).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 262-63.
170. Id. at 275-77.
171. Id. at 262.
172. Id. at 262, 275-76.
173. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Address (Sept. 23, 1932), avail-
able at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrcommonwealth.htm [hereinafter Commonwealth
Club Address].
174. Some of the "details" of this story were implicit in the San Francisco speech, but detailed by
Berle elsewhere. I include that other detailing as part of the overall "story" told by the San Francisco
speech.
175. See Commonwealth Club Address, supra note 173; see also Houck, supra note 164, at 268-69.
176. See Houck, supra note 164, at 268-69.
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opment of a centralized force in the nation, strong enough to im-
pose peace upon ruling barons. In many instances the victory of the
central government, the creation of a strong central government,
was a haven of refuge to the individual. The people preferred the
master far away to the exploitation and cruelty of the smaller mas-
ter near at hand.
But the creators of national government were perforce ruth-
less men. They were often cruel in their methods, but they did
strive steadily toward something that society needed and very much
wanted, a strong central state, able to keep the peace, to stamp out
civil war, to put the unruly nobleman in his place, and to permit the
bulk of individuals to live safely. The man of ruthless force had his
place in developing a pioneer country, just as he did in fixing the
power of the central government in the development of nations."'
Berle then introduced his second theme: the need for ruthless men
to bring order out of chaos eventually runs its course; then, countervail-
ing power must be introduced to reestablish the rights of the individual.178
This was the case in the three revolutions most important to our own de-
velopment: the English Revolution of 1688, and the late eighteenth-
century American and French Revolutions.
There came a growing feeling that government was conducted
for the benefit of a few who thrived unduly at the expense of all.
The people sought a balancing-a limiting force. There came grad-
ually, through town councils, trade guilds, national parliaments, by
constitution and by popular participation and control, limitations
on arbitrary power. 79
Berle then introduced his third theme: reestablishing the rights of
the individual after a period of rule by ruthless men always involves a
contest between those who would preserve as much of the old power as
possible against those who believe that power should be distributed and
determined democratically.1"
The United States, after its struggle for independence from Great
Britain, had faced two different visions. Hamilton "believed that the
safety of the republic lay in the autocratic strength of its government,
that the destiny of individuals was to serve that government, and that
fundamentally a great and strong group of central institutions, guided by
a small group of able and public spirited citizens could best direct all
government.""' In Jefferson's opposing view, which prevailed in the
election of 1800, government should not be an end in itself; rather gov-
ernment existed to serve the people."2
177. Commonwealth Club Address, supra note 173.
178. Houck, supra note 164, at 269.
179. Commonwealth Club Address, supra note 173.
180. Houck, supra note 164, at 269.
181. Commonwealth Club Address, supra note 173.
182. Id.
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With Jefferson's election, the golden age of individualism unfolded
in America.
So began, in American political life, the new day, the day of
the individual against the system, the day in which individualism
was made the great watchword of American life. The happiest of
economic conditions made that day long and splendid. On the
Western frontier, land was substantially free. No one, who did not
shirk the task of earning a living, was entirely without opportunity
to do so. Depressions could, and did, come and go; but they could
not alter the fundamental fact that most of the people lived partly
by selling their labor and partly by extracting their livelihood from
the soil, so that starvation and dislocation were practically impossi-
ble. At the very worst there was always the possibility of climbing
into a covered wagon and moving west where the untilled prairies
afforded a haven for men to whom the East did not provide a
place.'
In the United States, then, the individual replaced the autocrat. In
so doing, the United States was relocating power, not eliminating it, and
adopting the system of economic liberty that we attribute to Adam
Smith. *
Whereas the organization of feudal economic life rested upon
an elaborate system of binding customs, the organization under the
system of private enterprise has rested upon the self-interest of the
property owner-a self-interest held in check only by competition
and the conditions of supply and demand. Such self-interest has
long been regarded as the best guarantee of economic efficiency. It
has been assumed that, if the individual is protected in the right
both to use his own property as he sees fit and to receive the full
fruits of its use, his desire for personal gain, for profits, can be relied
upon as an effective incentive to his efficient use of any industrial
property he may possess.'5
Government had a limited role at the outset of America. "[E]ven
Jefferson realized that the exercise of the property rights might so inter-
fere with the rights of the individual that the government, without whose
assistance the property rights could not exist, must intervene, not to de-
stroy individualism but to protect it."' 86 Conditions during America's
golden age of individualism did not make the need for government inter-
vention likely, however. Ownership and control were still united, and
that naturally limited the possibility of individual abuse of power.
At that time, ownership and possession, or at least ownership
and management, were substantially united. What was known as
the absentee owner was the exception rather than the rule, and a
man could control his property in absentia only in the most precari-
183. Id.
184. BERLE & MEANs, supra note 1, at 345.
185. Id. at 8.
186. Commonwealth Club Address, supra note 173.
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ous ways. The richest man in the United States at the time the
Constitution was adopted was George Washington; and to him,
riches-unlimited right of possession-meant his broad acres of
Mount Vernon, a couple of stud farms which he kept not so far
away . . . and a few other bits of property, all under his direct and
immediate supervision. What is known as the corporation hardly
existed....
In a word, there was no way by which the property idea which
was guaranteed to individuals in the Constitution . . . could extend
very much beyond two great limitations. The first was the power of
the individual to manage and assume responsibility, and the second,
his willingness to assume direct legal liability for the results in terms
of debts or damages?
But the golden age of individualism would be short lived. As the
eighteenth century reached midpoint, what we now call the second indus-
trial revolution presented opportunities that the United States could not
ignore. The old concept of individualism still reigned in men's hearts and
minds, but it was again time for ruthless men of force to take the lead
and reap the rewards.
It was the middle of the 19th century that a new force was re-
leased and a new dream created. The force was what is called the
industrial revolution, the advance of steam and machinery and the
rise of the forerunners of the modern industrial plant. The dream
was the dream of an economic machine, able to raise the standard
of living for everyone; to bring luxury within the reach of the hum-
blest; to annihilate distance by steam power and later by electricity,
and to release everyone from the drudgery of the heaviest manual
toil. It was to be expected that this would necessarily affect gov-
ernment.
Heretofore, government had merely been called upon to pro-
duce conditions within which people could live happily, labor
peacefully, and rest secure. Now it was called upon to aid in the
consummation of this new dream. There was, however, a shadow
over the dream. To be made real, it required use of the talents of
men of tremendous will, and tremendous ambition, since by no oth-
er force could the problems of financing and engineering and new
developments be brought to a consummation.
So manifest were the advantages of the machine age, however,
that the United States fearlessly, cheerfully, and, I think, rightly, ac-
cepted the bitter with the sweet. It was thought that no price was
too high to pay for the advantages which we could draw from a fin-
ished industrial system. The history of the last half century is ac-
cordingly in large measure a history of a group of financial Titans,
whose methods were not scrutinized with too much care, and who
were honored in proportion as they produced the results, irrespec-
187. A.A. Berle, Jr., The New Deal and Economic Liberty, 178 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
Scl. 37, 38 (1935).
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tive of the means they used. The financiers who pushed the rail-
roads to the Pacific were always ruthless, we have them today. It
has been estimated that the American investor paid for the Ameri-
can railway system more than three times over in the process; but
despite that fact the net advantage was to the United States. As
long as we had free land; as long as population was growing by
leaps and bounds; as long as our industrial plants were insufficient
to supply our needs, society chose to give the ambitious man free
play and unlimited reward provided only that he produced the eco-
nomic plant so much desired."H
Berle's story then moves to his present-the presidential election
year of 1932. The Roaring Twenties and its celebration of big business
have come to a crashing end. The Great Depression is intensifying. Un-
employment is at record levels. Despair is everywhere. Plants sit idle,
while men hunger for work. And in this time of desperate suffering, the
part of the United States that is suffering the least are the modern corpo-
rations and their managers. While ordinary men and women cannot put
food on the table or find a job, the Princes of Industry are still wealthy
and in control of their powerful firms. They, individually and collective-
ly, are getting more and more powerful.
Recently a careful study was made of the concentration of
business in the United States. It showed that our economic life was
dominated by some six hundred odd corporations who controlled
two-thirds of American industry. Ten million small business men
divided the other third. More striking still, it appeared that if the
process of concentration goes on at the same rate, at the end of an-
other century we shall have all American industry controlled by a
dozen corporations, and run by perhaps a hundred men. Put plain-
ly, we are steering a steady course toward economic oligarchy, if we
are not there already. 89
The story's next move is crucial. A strong sentiment simmered
among progressives for a return to the golden age of individualism. 19 0 It
was a view championed by Justice Brandeis and others 9' to whom Roo-
sevelt might listen: if the modern corporation and the evolving corpora-
tion system threatened to become an economic oligarchy more powerful
than government, then was not the answer to put real teeth in the anti-
trust laws and break these industrial giants into small pieces? The an-
swer Roosevelt delivered in San Francisco was "yes" to government in-
tervention, but a resounding "no" to an attack on "bigness."
Just as in older times the central government was first a haven
of refuge, and then a threat, so now in a closer economic system the
central and ambitious financial unit is no longer a servant of na-
188. Commonwealth Club Address, supra note 173.
189. Id.
190. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 119, at 27-33.
191. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEw DEAL
(1959).
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tional desire, but a danger. I would draw the parallel one step far-
ther. We did not think because national government had become a
threat in the 18th century that therefore we should abandon the
principle of national government. Nor today should we abandon
the principle of strong economic units called corporations, merely
because their power is susceptible of easy abuse. In other times we
dealt with the problem of an unduly ambitious central government
by modifying it gradually into a constitutional democratic govern-
ment. So today we are modifying and controlling our economic
units.""
It was important, however, to emphasize that the modern corpora-
tions were not the root cause of the Great Depression or of the larger
malaise. Much of the problem could be traced to the breakdown of the
international order-to the inability of Great Britain to maintain eco-
nomic hegemony after the catastrophe of World War I. The era of free
trade was over, and the U.S. insistence on steadily raising tariffs had fi-
nally passed the limits of other countries' tolerance.193 Corporations, fol-
lowing the "logic of profit" had no choice but to reduce employment in
America.
Our system of constantly rising tariffs has at last reacted
against us to the point of closing our Canadian frontier on the
north, our European markets on the east, many of our Latin Amer-
ican markets to the south, and a goodly proportion of our Pacific
markets on the west, through the retaliatory tariffs of those coun-
tries. It has forced many of our great industrial institutions who ex-
ported their surplus production to such countries, to establish plants
in such countries within the tariff walls. This has resulted in the re-
duction of the operation of their American plants, and opportunity
for employment.19 4
Likewise, advances in production processes and of "science" gener-
ally, combined with the profit imperative, left individual corporations
with no choice but to eliminate jobs. Examples abounded.
In the railroad field, for example, in which a few years ago
1,800,000 men were employed, and now approximately 1,000,000,
the best traffic experts in the field estimate that if business were to
return to 1929 levels tomorrow, they would employ approximately
1,250,000 men, leaving about 550,000 men permanently out of em-
ployment, because they have learned in the years of the depression
to do their job more efficiently. 95
There were areas where the modern corporations were at fault and
where their power needed to be curbed. But this could not be an across-
the-board restraint on management power. What was needed was re-
192. Commonwealth Club Address, supra note 173.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. Berle, supra note 187, at 46.
1031
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
straint on management's ability to self-deal, not its ability to manage the
business.
A management may well insist on as free a managerial hand as
possible as to how it shall run its business. Nor has anyone grudged
managements this group of powers, not only in law but in ideology.
No better principle in carrying on business has yet been worked out
than to find able men and give them the completest latitude possi-
ble in handling the enterprise.
Latitude of power in the field of distribution of interests or as
affecting the property rights of the participants raises different is-
sues. It is one thing to say that a management shall be sole judge of
how a factory shall be run. It is quite another to give that same
group sole power to determine which of the various groups in a
corporation shall receive the income; or to give it power to take
away at will rights formerly belonging to stockholders and hand
them over to outsiders or appropriate them to the management.196
The disproportionate rewards claimed by the Great Tycoons could
no longer be afforded or justified. The American frontier had closed.
The second industrial revolution was essentially complete. Now was the
time for a reorientation of the modern corporation and the empower-
ment of the U.S. government. It was time for a new deal.
Clearly, all this calls for a re-appraisal of values. A mere
builder of more industrial plants, a creator of more railroad sys-
tems, and organizer of more corporations, is as likely to be a danger
as a help. The day of the great promoter or the financial Titan, to
whom we granted anything if only he would build, or develop, is
over. Our task now is not discovery or exploitation of natural re-
sources, or necessarily producing more goods. It is the soberer, less
dramatic business of administering resources and plants already in
hand, of seeking to reestablish foreign markets for our surplus pro-
duction, of meeting the problem of under consumption, of adjusting
production to consumption, of distributing wealth and products
more equitably, of adapting existing economic organizations to the
service of the people. The day of enlightened administration has
come. 97
The framework had now been laid for both the New Deal, the tam-
ing of the modern corporation, and, ultimately, the United States of
America's ascension to the role of world hegemon. All that remained
were the details.
196. Berle & Means, supra note 157, at 60.
197. Commonwealth Club Address, supra note 173.
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IV. THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE-FROM THE NEw DEAL TO
1950
A. Overview
As Franklin Roosevelt assumed the presidency on Saturday, March
4, 1933, the United States and the world were in crisis.198 The Great De-
pression roared on. The international order was disintegrating. War
lurked around the corner. Roosevelt would preside over the U.S. re-
sponse to this chaos-a response that upon the close of World War II
would see a transformed American state assume the mantle of world
hegemon." From Roosevelt's presidency to the early 1970s, the United
States of America would develop and rule a new world economic order.
The modern corporations and its managers would be transformed in this
period; the corporations would become fully partnered with the U.S.
government in the orderly administration of the U.S. economy and socie-
ty; the managers would recede into the twilight, no longer Titans, content
in their role as enlightened administrators of the technocracy, content
along with shareholders in receiving a lesser share of U.S. wealth.2" The
modern corporations, however, would remain in control of their changed
environment, locked in a mutually advantageous, symbiotic relationship
with government. Berle's vision of a dynamic partnership between the
modern corporation and government-a vision of capitalism embedded
within a socially democratic society201 -would be realized.
B. The New Deal- The Partnerships Between Government and the
Modern Corporation
The New Deal unfolded over Roosevelt's first two terms. In the
famous first hundred days, a landslide of legislation began the United
States of America's transition from laissez-faire to a Keynesian activist
state.2" Over the remainder of the 1930s and the course of World War II,
the new relationships between government and the modern corporation
198. SCHLESINGER, supra note 119, at 480-85.
199. For discussion of the attributes of hegemony, see ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 30-33. The
U.S. ascension to full hegemony coincided with the end of World War II. Id. at 338-39.
200. For comprehensive treatment of this point, see GALBRAITH, supra note 19.
201. I use the term "social democracy" with the meaning ascribed by Tony Judt:
A liberal is someone who opposes interference in the affairs of others: who is tolerant of dissent-
ing attitudes and unconventional behavior.... Most genuine liberals remain disposed to leave
other people alone.
Social democrats, on the other hand, are something of a hybrid. They share with liberals a
commitment to cultural and religious tolerance. But in public policy social democrats believe in
the possibility and virtue of collective action for the collective good. Like most liberals, social
democrats favor progressive taxation in order pay for public services and other social goods that
individuals cannot provide themselves; but whereas many liberals might see such taxation or pub-
lic provision as a necessary evil, a social democratic vision of the good society entails from the
outset a greater role for the state and the public sector.
TONY JUDT, ILL FARES THE LAND 4-5 (2010).
202. Id. at 41-80.
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emerged. Decentralized governance of the economy had failed. The
modern corporations were alone incapable of providing opportunity, in-
comes, and security to the American worker. Nor were the modern cor-
porations able to control the overall stability of the economy. It was time
for government to enter the fray.
With respect to the modern corporation, the New Deal began with a
radical departure from laissez-faire individualism-the adoption of the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (the NRA).03 The leaders of
America's great corporations were ready for the change. Presaging the
NRA was the idea put forth most prominently by Gerald Swope, then
president of General Electric.
Swope's idea was the organization into trade associations of all
firms with more than 50 employees engaged in interstate business.
These trade associations would be self-governing units with respon-
sibility for "coordinating" production and consumption and "stabi-
lizing" prices; to accomplish this coordination, there would have to
be uniform accounting practices and access to company books. The
companies would further adopt pension and unemployment insur-
ance systems, to be paid for and managed by both employers and
employees. On top of the cluster of trade associations would be a
national economic council. In short, in exchange for the carteliza-
tion of a substantial part of American industry, Swope proposed to
guarantee to labor a high degree of employment or, that failing, un-
employment insurance.2 04
Title I of the NRA authorized cartelization along the lines proposed
by Swope.2 05 Title II of the same act authorized a broad public works
program.20 The goal was to quickly stimulate demand, while putting in
place the apparatus of central economic planning. 207 At the signing cer-
emony on June 16, 1933, President Roosevelt elaborated.
The purpose of the bill, the President said . .. was to put peo-
ple back to work. It was to raise the purchasing power of labor by
limiting hours and increasing wages. It was to elevate labor stand-
ards by making sure that no employer would suffer competitive dis-
advantages as a result of paying decent wages or establishing decent
working conditions. Above all, it represented an historic experi-
ment in government partnership with business.208
Prophetically, Roosevelt concluded, "History probably will record
the National Industrial Recovery Act as the most important and far-
reaching legislation ever enacted by the American Congress." 2" Despite
203. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (partially overturned by A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
204. SCHLESINGER, supra note 119, at 182.
205. SCHLESINGER, supra note 191, at 98-99.
206. Id. at 99.
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the Supreme Court's repeal of much of the NRA in 1935,210 Roosevelt's
pronouncement proved correct. The NRA signified national agreement
on the future partnership of government and the modern corporation.
Some details would ultimately be worked out in context-specific legisla-
tion-for example, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Social Se-
curity Act. More important, however, was the shared understanding be-
tween government and business elites: America could recognize its
promise only through the partnership between two equal forces-the
modern corporation and a strengthened, activist, U.S. government.2"
As the 1930s drew to a close, the United States had transformed
from laissez-faire governance to a modern social democracy. Govern-
ment and business had accepted Keynesianism as the answer to business
cycles and periodic fluctuations in demand.212 Put simply, "[t]he essence
of the New Deal was the notion that big government must spend liberally
in order to achieve security and progress."213 The 1930s provided only a
limited opportunity to test the possibilities of the Keynesian state. World
War II would fill that gap.
C. 1940 to 1950-World War II and Post-War Reconstruction
World War II provided the final impetus for U.S. world hegemony.
Entering the 1940s, the United States was the world's greatest economic
power2 14 but clung to isolationism. The United Sates still viewed World
War I as a mistake not to be repeated. Congress had spun a web of neu-
trality-enforcing legislation intended to prevent a repeat engagement. 215
210. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
211. SCHLESINGER, supra note 191, at 103-76. Schlesinger summarizes the NRA's lasting impact
as follows:
The more 'enduring achievements of NRA lay not in the economic but in the social field. Here
NRA accomplished a fantastic series of reforms, any one of which would have staggered the na-
tion a few years earlier. It established the principle of maximum hours and minimum wages on a
national basis. It abolished child labor. It dealt a fatal blow to sweatshops. It made collective
bargaining a national policy and thereby transformed the position of organized labor. It gave new
status to the consumer. It stamped out a noxious collection of unfair trade practices. It set new
standards of economic decency in American life-standards which could not be rolled back,
whatever happened to NRA....
More than this, NRA helped break the chains of economic fatalism which had so long
bound the nation.... The psychological stimulus gave people new confidence in their capacity to
work out their economic salvation.... Of equal importance, NRA taught the people the meaning
and implications of the national economy.... It accustomed the country to the feasibility of gov-
ernment regulation and taught people to think in terms of national policy for business and for la-
bor.
Id. at 174-75.
212. Id. at 219-30 (describing the genesis of John Maynard Keynes's personal and intellectual
influence on American monetary and fiscal policy).
213. FRANZ SCHURMANN, THE LOGIC OF WORLD POWER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS,
CURRENTS, AND CONTRADICTIONS OF WORLD POLITICS 67 (1974).
214. See ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 284-85 ("In 1938 US national income was already about the
same as the combined national incomes of Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries,
and almost three times that of the USSR.").
215. CHARLES A. STEVENSON. WARRIORS AND POLITICIANS: US CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
UNDER STRESS 95-96 (2006).
1035
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
Content with the protection provided by its geographic insularity,2 16 the
United States had invested little in its military.217
The US military was a pitiful force, labeled by General George
C. Marshall "a third-rate power." The US army in 1939 ranked
nineteenth in size, between Portugal and Bulgaria, and was forty-
fifth in terms of the percentage of the population under arms. Its
units were mostly under strength, and it did not even have enough
ammunition for target practice.2 18
As the war in Europe spread, however, American sentiment gradu-
ally changed. Slowly the United States began to rearm. With Japan's at-
tack on Pearl Harbor, isolationism vanished, and the United States mobi-
lized on an unparalleled scale.2 19 For the first time since the Great
Depression, all who wanted work could find it.220 The United States now
could experiment on a grand scale with Keynesianism and the new rela-
tionship between government and business.
And experiment on a grand scale it did. Just as it had done in
World War I, "the United States acted as the workshop of the Allied war
effort." 221 The U.S. government served as central coordinator of eco-
nomic production, determining what should be produced, providing fi-
nancing to accelerate construction of new facilities, and tightly control-
ling prices and wages.222
It [was] one of the most astonishing feats in all economic histo-
ry. In the first six months of 1942, the government gave out more
than $100 billion in military contracts, more than the entire gross
national product of 1940. In the war years, American industry
turned out 6,500 naval vessels; 296,400 airplanes; 86,300 tanks;
64,546 landing craft; 3.5 million jeeps, trucks, and personnel carri-
ers; 53 million deadweight tons of cargo vessels; 12 million rifles,
carbines, and machine guns; and 47 million tons of artillery shells,
together with millions of tons of uniforms, boots, medical supplies,
tents, and a thousand other items needed to fight a modern war....
[From 1940 to 1945] GNP increased by 56.3 percent.223
At war's end, the United States began its reign as world hegemon.
"[T]he world was in a shambles but the national wealth and power of the
United States had reached unprecedented and unparalleled heights."224
The United States had seventy percent of the world's gold reserves and
total control over world liquidity.225 The United States had the world's
largest pool of consumption capacity and investment capital. It had the
216. Id. at 93.
217. Id. at 93-94.
218. Id. at 93.
219. GORDON, supra note 53, at 353.
220. Id. at 358.
221. ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 275.
222. GORDON, supra note 53, at 353-59.
223. Id. at 353-54, 357.
224. ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 275-76.
225. Id. at 275.
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strongest military. And its modern corporations provided the world's
most efficient production capacity.
The American state now turned to reestablishing international or-
der. It did not repeat the errors of World War I. Rather than humiliat-
ing the defeated nations, the United States focused its efforts on rebuild-
ing Germany and Japan in its own image as model social democracies.226
Similar efforts were focused broadly on the reconstruction of Europe via
the Marshall plan.2 2 7
Thus, postwar security would require liberal outlays by the
United States in order to overcome the chaos created by the
war.... Aid to .. . poor nations would have the same effect as so-
cial welfare programs within the United States -it would give them
the security to overcome chaos and prevent them from turning into
violent revolutionaries. Meanwhile, they would be drawn inextri-
cably into the revived world market system. ... Helping Britain and
the remainder of Western Europe would rekindle economic
growth, which would stimulate transatlantic trade and, thus, help
the American economy in the long run.22
The refinement and execution of this plan would frame the age of
U.S. world hegemony-the period running from the end of World War II
to 1973.
V. 1950 TO 1973-THE HEYDAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM
The golden era of the modern corporation corresponds with the pe-
riod of American world hegemony. The period begins around 1950,
when U.S. post-World War II reconstruction efforts had stabilized Eu-
rope and Japan, and when hostilities in the Korean Peninsula had
reached the boiling point; the endpoint coincides with America's ac-
ceptance of defeat in the Vietnam War in early 1973.229 During this peri-
od the world economy experienced unprecedented growth fueled by U.S.
militarization.23 0 U.S. corporations were critical partners in this effort,
and, like the American state, experienced a period of unprecedented
growth and security.231 During this period, as Berle had forecast, the
modern corporation increased its control over U.S. industry. Further, as
Berle had predicted, the Great Tycoons, the ruthless men of force, re-
ceded into the crannies of U.S. business. Within the modern corpora-
tion, managers were but part of the technocracy. As such, the compensa-
tion they received paled in comparison to pre-Great Depression business
226. Id. at 296.
227. Id.
228. SCHURMANN, supra note 213, at 67.
229. See ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 306-07; THOMAS J. MCCORMICK, AMERICA'S HALF-
CENTURY: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE COLD WAR 99 (1989).
230. MCCORMICK, supra note 229, at 92-99 (noting that the United States consciously adopted
militarism as the best way to spur the economy).
231. ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 307.
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elites.23 2 Rentier shareholders similarly accepted a much smaller share of
U.S. income and wealth than pre-Great Depression counterparts. 23
As predicted by Berle in 1930, modern corporations would continue
to grow larger, controlling an ever-increasing share of the nation's indus-
trial wealth. As Berle noted, "It is the large corporation which makes the
difference." 234 This remained true in the 1950s and 1960s. Another fea-
ture of the economy also remained unchanged. As Berle observed in
1967, "American economics at present is dominantly, perhaps over-
whelmingly, industrial." 235 Thus, in 1932, and still in the 1950s and 1960s,
it was the large industrial corporation that controlled the economy.
A broader point also remained true. Berle had argued in 1932 that
[O]ur industrial plant is built .... Our last frontier has long since
been reached, and there is practically no more free land. ... The
day of the great promoter or the financial Titan, to whom we grant-
ed anything if only he would build, or develop, is over.. . . The day
of enlightened administration has come. 236
By conflating the building of our industrial plant and the closing of
our western frontier, Berle was highlighting a key reality: the second in-
dustrial revolution essentially had been completed. Vaclav Smil has re-
cently amplified that point:
[M]any techniques whose everyday use keeps defining and shaping
the modern civilization had not undergone any fundamental change
during the course of the 20th century. Their qualitative gains
(higher efficiency, increased reliability, greater convenience of their
use, lower specific pollution rates) took place without any change of
basic, long-established concepts.
. . . [T]he fundamental means to realize nearly all of the 20th-
century accomplishments were put in place even before the century
began, mostly during the three closing decades of the 19th century
and in the years preceding WWI. That period ranks as history's
most remarkable discontinuity not only because of the extensive
sweep of its innovations but also because of the rapidity of funda-
mental advances that were achieved during that time.23 7
The second industrial revolution had been brought to fruition by
the Great Tycoons and by an assortment of entrepreneurial inventors.
[A] notable characteristic of the great pre-WWI technical dis-
continuity is the imagination and boldness of new proposals. There
is no better testimony to the remarkable pioneering spirit of the era
than the fact that so many of its inventors were eager to bring to life
232. See infra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
233. See infra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
234. Berle & Means, supra note 157, at 58 (emphasis in original).
235. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY, at ix (rev. ed. 1967).
236. Commonwealth Club Address, supra note 173.
237. VACLAV SMIL, CREATING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: TECHNICAL INNOVATIONS OF 1867-
1914 AND THEIR LASTING IMPACT 5-6 (2005).
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practical applications of devices and processes that seemed utterly
impractical, even impossible, to so many of their contemporaries. 238
It was these ruthless, forceful men, individualists, lone wolves,
whose work was done at the time of the New Deal. But, of course, the
work of the second industrial revolution itself was not done, and it was
the job of the modern corporation to continue that work239- to innovate
and improve industrial processes, further develop products, and continue
to make practical the teachings of science.
Berle foresaw correctly that the modern corporation, in carrying out
the unfolding blueprint of the second industrial revolution, would need
enlightened administration. By the 1950s that enlightened administra-
tion was fully in place. As Berle predicted it lay not in autocratic, top-
down, entrepreneurs. Rather, direction of the modern corporation had
devolved to the internal bureaucracy of the firm, what John Kenneth
Galbraith termed "the technocracy."240
Studying the modern corporation during the 1950s and 1960s, Gal-
braith discovered an internal decision-making society at work. Contrary
to the simple world modeled by Adam Smith,2 41 the modern corporation
of that era (what I sometimes call "the Galbraithian modern corpora-
tion") was involved in economic planning that often spanned many years
between the initiation of a product's development and the actual bring-
ing of that product to market.2 42 The modern corporation could not de-
pend on the market to accomplish these complex, long-term projects.
For example, capital could not be invested years in advance in the
"hope" that profitable sales would ultimately occur. The modern corpo-
ration must "know" that a profitable market will exist. Accordingly,
product development and other decisions require foresight, which de-
pends on the information, knowledge, and specialized skills of the mod-
ern corporation's technocracy. Importantly, the input of each member of
the technocracy must be coordinated, and almost all decisions will be
made by groups. The formal hierarchy of the firm-the descending chain
of command envisioned by organization charts-plays almost no role in
the actual functioning of the firm.
Thus decision in the modern business enterprise is the product
not of individuals but of groups. The groups are numerous, as often
informal as formal, and subject to constant change in composition.
Each contains the men possessed of the information, or with access
to the information, that bears on the particular decision together
with those whose skill consists in extracting and testing this infor-
mation and obtaining a conclusion. This is how men act successful-
238. Id. at 11.
239. James P. Hull, The Second Industrial Revolution and the Staples Frontier in Canada: Rethink-
ing Knowledge and History, 18 CANADIAN J. HIST. SCI., TECH. & MED. 22,23 (1994).
240. GALBRAITH, supra note 19, at 62-74.
241. Id. at 48-59.
242. Id. at 18-21.
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ly on matters where no single one, however exalted or intelligent,
has more than a fraction of the necessary knowledge. 243
As for the Galbraithian modern corporation's president,2" he "exer-
cise[s] only modest powers of substantive decision." 245 This is necessary.
The president cannot meaningfully review the substantive work done by
the technocracy, whose group decisions collectively involve knowledge
and expertise that the president does not possess. Moreover, interfering
with decisions of the technocracy in this way would undercut the motiva-
tional incentives of members of the technocracy.
One of Galbraith's most important contributions to our understand-
ing of the mature modern corporation is his deconstruction of motiva-
tion.246 Traditional economic theory assumes that persons make econom-
ic decisions primarily by pecuniary calculus; this assumption undergirds
the laissez-faire ideology that we associate with Adam Smith and the
Chicago School of Economics.2 47 Galbraith found a very different dy-
namic at work in the modern corporation. The principal problem for any
organization is how to coordinate the activities of members-this is the
job of motivation. Four motivation strategies are theoretically available,
alone or in combination-compulsion, pecuniary motivation, identifica-
tion, and adaptation.2 48 Contrary to the assumptions of traditional eco-
nomic theory, pecuniary motivation is not the sole motivator explaining
decisions made by corporate actors.
Compulsion -forcing someone to perform -produces no loyalty
and the highest cost to the firm in terms of oversight and monitoring.
Pecuniary motivation- paying someone to perform -provides loyalty
only until another firm makes a better offer. Persons who work simply
for the monetary reward also have little loyalty, and cannot be expected
to work cooperatively and for the best interests of the corporation, unless
their compensation will be affected. Moreover, if the opportunity to
shirk presents itself, the employee will probably take advantage. Thus,
monitoring and supervisory costs are high and cascade throughout the
firm when pecuniary compensation is the primary motivation strategy.
Within the Galbraithian modern corporation, pecuniary compensa-
tion is rarely the sole motivating factor. Rather, members of the tech-
nocracy are motivated to differing degrees either because they identify
with the goals of the firm and derive tremendous satisfaction therefrom,
or because they partially identify with the goals of the firm and hope to
be able to change the firm-to adapt it to their own goals.2 49 Even lower-
level workers are not solely motivated by compensation.2 10 Interestingly,
243. GALBRAffH, supra note 19, at 65.
244. The 1960s president is the formal organization chart equivalent of today's CEO.
245. GALBRATTH, supra note 19, at 70.
246. Id. at 140-58.
247. See id. at 49-54, 121-25; O'Kelley, supra note 38, at 1332-34.
248. GALBRAnTH, supra note 19, at 130-32.
249. Id. at 166-78.
250. Id. at 134-39.
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viewed from this perspective, we see shareholder claims in a different
light.
In the outermost circle in the mature corporation are the ordi-
nary stockholders. This for all practical purposes is a purely pecu-
niary association....
The next inward circle is occupied by the production workers.
Here, already, motivation becomes mixed.... [A]n individual
comes to think of himself as an IBM man, a Corning Glass man or a
Sears man....
Next, as one moves inward, are foremen and supervisory per-
sonnel and the clerical, sales and other routine white collar person-
nel. These merge at their inner perimeter with technicians, engi-
neers, sales executives, scientists, designers and other specialists
who comprise the technostructure. Beyond these at the center are
the executives or management. As one moves through these inner
circles, identification and adaptation become increasingly im-
portant.251
Traditional economic theory models the firm as a profit-maximizing
unit.25 2 Adolf Berle feared that managers of the modern corporation,
freed from the control of shareholders, would selfishly allocate corporate
profits. But by the 1950s, the mature modern corporation responds not
to the dictates of the shareholders or senior managers but to the needs
and wishes of the technocracy.253 The goals of the technocracy do not in-
clude maximizing firm wealth or shareholder wealth. Rather, goal one is
ensuring the survival of the corporation, and, thus, the survival of the
technocracy.254 For that, seeking to maximize profit or wealth is risky.
Instead, the modem corporation seeks to maximize a dependable and
safe level of earnings, while minimizing the risk of catastrophic loss.
Closely related is a second goal-maintaining the autonomy of the tech-
nocracy.255 This, too, is not consistent with maximizing shareholder re-
turns. Rather, the technocracy will seek to protect itself from the need to
obtain outside loans or new infusions of capital by retaining earnings at
the highest possible level. A third, related goal is growth.2 6 The tech-
nocracy seeks to maximize growth. Because the technocracy works in
groups, firing a member of the technocracy is demoralizing and cuts
against members' ability to identify with the firm. Growth provides a
cushion against temporary downturns in business fortune. Finally, the
technocracy seeks "technological virtuosity."257 Successful innovation
means promotions and more hiring for the technocrats in the firm. It al-
251. Id. at 150-53.
252. Id. at 121-25.
253. See id. at 86.
254. Id. at 167.
255. Id. at 169-71.
256. Id. at 171-72.
257. Id. at 174-75.
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so increases technocrats' sense of satisfaction and identification with the
firm.258
The Galbraithian-era CEO sits at the top of the technocracy, and
his personal satisfaction is intertwined with the goals of the technocracy.
The corporation is his life. While the CEO has limited substantive deci-
sion-making power, he does have an important role: "Leadership does
cast the membership of the groups that make the decisions and it consti-
tutes and reconstitutes these groups in accordance with changing need.
This is its most important function. In an economy where organized in-
telligence is the decisive factor of production, this is not unimportant." 25 9
In wielding this power to determine group membership, however,
the Galbraithian CEO is not acting as the classic, Knightian entrepreneur
to maximize profits: "Apart from access to capital, [the classical entre-
preneur's] principal qualifications were imagination, capacity for decision
and courage in risking money .... None of these qualifications are espe-
cially important for organizing intelligence ... .26
As Berle noted, ownership has been separated from control. Ra-
ther than pursue selfish ends, however, the CEO is left with a far greater
attachment to the technocracy which he "leads" and serves, and with
whom he identifies. The CEO uses his authority to organize the firm's
working groups and structure, not to maximize profits of the firm or
shareholders, but to further the goals of the technocracy which are large-
ly his own. Thus, decisions are made in order to enhance the ability of
technocrats to identify with the firm, to reward team members who are
able to further the goals of the technocracy, and, if possible, to subtly and
incrementally adapt the corporation to the CEO's own values. None of
this has much to do with shareholder or firm wealth maximization.
As for his own wealth and happiness, the Galbraithian-era CEO
looks largely to his place in the corporation for the satisfaction of his
needs.
In very recent times, it has become fashionable, although not
yet obligatory, for the corporation executive to have some non-
business interests apart from therapeutic recreation and community
service... . But it is still normally a matter of pride that the corpora-
tion absorbs nearly all his waking energy. All else including family,
politics, sometimes even alcohol and sex, are secondary. "To the
executive there is between work and other aspects of one's life a
unity he can never fully explain.. . . How can you overwork, execu-
tives ask, if your work is your life?" This is to say that the organiza-
tion satisfies his needs with marked repleteness-that this induce-
ment to identification is also fully satisfied.26'
258. Id.
259. Id. at 70.
260. Id. at 58.
261. Id. at 154-55.
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Necessarily, then, the Galbraithian-era CEO could not lobby for
substantially higher compensation than others near his rank in the tech-
nocracy, nor could management as a group ask for such treatment, or,
indeed, allow themselves to think in pecuniary terms about their rela-
tionship to the firm.
Identification and adaptation . . . are the operative motiva-
tions. They are also the only personally reputable ones: the execu-
tive cannot afford to have it thought that his commitment to the
goals of the corporation is less than complete or that he is at all in-
different to his opportunity to shape these goals. To suggest that he
subordinates these latter motives to his response to pay would be to
confess that he is an inferior executive. 262
As a result, in terms of pecuniary wealth and income, the CEO of
the Galbraithian era was a pauper compared to the CEOs of 1930 and of
the current millennium. His lifestyle so reflected.
[A] top executive ... lives on an economic scale not too differ-
ent from that of the man on the next-lower income rung. He sur-
renders around 40 per cent of his salary to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (he may cough up as much as 75 per cent) but still manag-
es to put a little of his income in stocks, bonds, life insurance. He
owns two cars, and gets along with one or two servants. What time
he has left from his work-on weekends and brief vacations-he
spends exercising, preferably outdoors, and usually at golf. Next to
golf, fishing is the most popular executive diversion....
Twenty-five years have altered the executive way of life no-
ticeably; in 1930 the average businessman had been buffeted by the
economic storms but he had not yet been battered by the income
tax. The executive still led a life ornamented by expensive adjuncts
that other men could not begin to afford, a life attended by a for-
mality that other men did not have time for. In Boston, which set
the highest tone if not the fastest pace, the archetype of the high-
salaried executive of 1930 arrived at his office in his chauffeur-
driven Pierce-Arrow, uncompromisingly attired in dark suit and de-
tachable stiff collar. For weekend lounging white flannels were de
rigueur.
Today an executive, outside of Boston at least, may arrive at
his office in tan shoes, sometimes in a tweed jacket with side vents.
And he may well do his weekending in shorts-pink ones this
year....
The executive's home today is likely to be unpretentious and
relatively small-perhaps seven rooms and two and a half baths.
(Servants are hard to come by and many a vice president's wife gets
along with part-time help. So many have done so for so long, in
fact, that they no longer complain much about it)....
As executives' homes have dwindled in size, so have their par-
ties. Frederick J. Thibold, catering manager at Sherry's in New
262. Id. at 138-39.
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York, can remember dances for 2,000 with a "sumptuous supper"
twenty-five years ago. A big dance today is one for 400, and at
some of these, Thibold confides in a whisper, Sherry's has served
hot dogs and hamburgers....
The large yacht has also foundered in the sea of progressive
taxation. In 1930, Fred Fisher (Bodies), Walter Briggs, and Alfred
P. Sloan cruised around in vessels 235 feet long; J.P. Morgan had
just built his fourth Corsair (343 feet). Today, seventy-five feet is
considered a lot of yacht. One of the biggest yachts launched in the
past five years is the ninety-six-foot Rhonda III, built and owned by
Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., of Birmingham, Alabama. The Rhonda
III cost half a million dollars to build, and the annual bill for keep-
ing a crew aboard her, stocking her, and fueling her runs to around
$130,000. As Chairman Robert I. Ingalls Jr. says, only corpora-
tions today can own even so comparatively modest a craft. The
specifications of the boat that interests the great majority of seago-
ing executives today are "forty feet, four people, $40,000." In this
tidy vessel the businessman of 1955 is quite happily sea-borne.263
A look at the empirical data helps us interpret this anecdotal ac-
count. The income share of the top one percent of Americans reached
19.5% immediately before the Great Depression, and fell to 15% by
1933.214 Though it fluctuated higher at times during the New Deal, it had
fallen again to 15% at the commencement of World War 11.265 During
the War, income shares again fell sharply for the top 1%, reaching 11%
in 1943 and remaining at or near that level until the Korean War.266 Dur-
ing that engagement, income shares of the top percentile fell again.
From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, the income share of the top per-
centile of Americans remained eerily steady at around 8%.267
Not only did income shares fall for the top one percent, the source
of income changed dramatically. In 1928, top percentile income came
predominantly from capital gains and dividends.2 68 By the 1960s, top per-
centile income came primarily from wages.2 69 This suggests that the pop-
ular comparison of Galbraithian-era CEOs to Roaring Twenties CEOs is
misleading. The owners of great yachts and throwers of great parties
were the Great Tycoons and others who had made or inherited tremen-
dous fortunes during the sixty years or so following the Civil War. These
were the Great Tycoons that, as Berle said, society could no longer af-
ford. And, in fact, from the New Deal onward, the Great Tycoons and
rentier shareholders claimed an increasingly smaller share of the profits
created by the modern corporation.
263. Duncan Norton-Taylor, How Top Executives Live, FORTUNE, July 1955, at 78,79,80.
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During the Galbraithian era, from 1950 to 1973, the modem corpo-
ration reached the maturity prophesized in Roosevelt's Commonwealth
Club address. Control of the modern corporation-separated from
stockholders-now resided firmly in the technostructure, the enlightened
administrators called for by Berle.270 The share of corporate profits and
national income going to Great Tycoons and rentier shareholders had
declined, reflecting the modern corporation's diminished need for the
services of both capital and the entrepreneur.
As Adolf Berle observed in 1967, it appeared that the U.S. econom-
ic revolution, begun with the New Deal, was well under way. The aver-
age American was healthier and more secure. Income inequality had
diminished greatly. The opportunity to participate in American econom-
ic life had been broadened substantially by the Civil Rights movement of
the 1960s. The future looked bright and the path clear.271 Few would
have predicted that almost overnight the motivational ethos and under-
pinnings of the Galbraithian modern corporation would go gentle into
the night,272 to be only dimly remembered a long generation later.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS-THE NATURE AND POWER OF THE
MODERN-DAY CEO
Against the backdrop I have painted-the evolution of the modern
corporation from the Civil War to 1973-I will close with some observa-
tions and intuitions about the power of the modern-day CEO. I share
these thoughts most tentatively, as the very first stage of bringing sense
to what we are experiencing with respect to the continuing evolution of
the American business firm. What we need, of course, is another Berle
to write what Timothy Garton Ash calls "a history of the present."27 3
Like all attempts to order events that are near in time-trends, currents,
and themes that seem obvious to me today-my thoughts and intuitions
may prove as prophetically wrong as were the historians who did not see
coming the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Reaching back to 1973, it is now accepted that a wholly unexpected
change in the expected course of contemporary history happened very
rapidly, much the same way the Great Depression and New Deal had
blindsided America at the end of the Roaring Twenties. The change that
occurred had a profound ideological dimension, although it is difficult to
say which came first-the shift in ideology or the very stark changes in
America's relationship to the world.
The ideological shift, in the making during the mid-1970s, substan-
tially in place in the early 1980s and popularly identified as the Reagan
270. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
271. Berle, supra note 33, at 18, 20.
272. The allusion is to Dylan Thomas. DYLAN THOMAS, Do Not Go Gentle into That Good
Night, in THE POEMS OF DYLAN THOMAS 239 (New Directions rev. ed. 2003).
273. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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Revolution, represented a return to a species of laissez-faire capitalism.
Glorified were the power of free markets, privatization of previously
government functions, curtailment of social welfare spending, sweeping
reductions in trade barriers, and extensive deregulation of industry.274 In
the field of corporation law scholarship and in the board rooms of Amer-
ica's dominant corporations, an insistent new mantra was heard-the
purpose of the corporation is to maximize shareholder value.
Corporate CEOs almost overnight became rock stars, and their
compensation quickly reflected this new status. In 1980, the CEO of an
S&P 500 corporation received compensation forty-two times the pay of
an average U.S. worker."' By 2011, that same CEO made 380 times the
pay of an average American worker.2 1 Pay gains, however, have not
been restricted to the top percentile. The top ten percent of Americans
have also done exceedingly well compared to the bottom ninety percent.
From World War II to the 1970s, the top decile's income share remained
near constant at thirty-three percent.2 77 Since then, the top ten percent
have seen their share of income rise steadily, reaching 47.9% in 2011.78
As Emmanuel Saez concludes, "the labor market has been creating much
more inequality over the last thirty years, with the very top earners cap-
turing a large fraction of macroeconomic productivity gains." 279 Most of
these top earners are corporate CEOs, entrepreneurs, and other mem-
bers of the modern corporation's technocracy. Those who are losing are
blue-collar workers, government employees, and others not in the inner
circle of the technocracy.
These changes in income shares correspond to a loss in job security
for ordinary workers. The impact of the streamlining of American firms
fueled by the bust-up takeover phenomena in the early 1980s and the
substantial job losses resulting from computerization were most heavily
felt by less skilled, already lower-paid, workers.28 Additionally, the off-
shoring of significant segments of America's industrial production activi-
ties adversely affected blue-collar workers.
This startling return to free-market ideology28' and the return to in-
equality not seen since the Roaring Twenties occurred at the same time
274. Gil Troy, Ronald Reagan's 100-Day Revolution, in LIVING IN THE EIGHTIES 10, 10-23 (Gil
Troy & Vincent J. Cannato eds., 2009).
275. CEO-to-Worker Pay Gap, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/CEO-Pay-and-
the-99/CEO-to-worker-Pay-Gap (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).
276. Id.
277. Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States
(Updated with 2009 and 2010 Estimates) 2 (Mar. 2, 2012), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/
-saez/saez-UStopincomes-2010.pdf (updating Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer: The Evolution of
Top Incomes in the United States, PATHWAYS MAG., Winter 2008, at 6).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 5.
280. HOBSBAWM, supra note 52, at 413.
281. Id. at 103 ("Those of us who lived through the years of the Great Slump still find it almost
impossible to understand how the orthodoxies of the pure free market, then so obviously discredited,
once again came to preside over a period of depression in the late 1980s and 1990s, which, once again,
they were equally unable to understand or to deal with.").
1046 [Vol. 2013
No.3] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN CONTEXT
as the crisis in American hegemony. In 1971, after its profligate spending
on the Vietnam War, the United States was forced to abandon the gold
standard, ushering in a new era of fiat money and floating exchange
rates. 2 2 As a result, the U.S. government lost its ability to spend without
limit in advancing its interests and the interest of U.S. corporations.8 At
the same time, the recovery of Europe and Japan, and the emergence of
strong economies in Southeast Asia, challenged U.S. economic domi-
nance. 21 Firms globally had now successfully copied the internal man-
agement and vertical integration strategies of the U.S. corporation.8
With the creation of the unified European market and the reduction of
world trade barriers, the geographical advantage of controlling a large
home market substantially diminished.286 In short, the United States and
its corporations were losing dominance in world markets. These facts
alone would suggest a need for a renewed focus on productivity, and why
the measuring rod used would be the rather crude, but objective, focus
on corporate profits and shareholder wealth maximization.
At the same time it is possible that the world is entering what some
have termed the third industrial revolution. In 1965, Adolf Berle, always
a visionary and a keen "historian of the present," quoted the following
from a Research Institute of America study:
A third industrial revolution is in the making, as dramatic as
those which followed the harnessing of steam power and the prolif-
eration of electricity. This one will be sired by the release of nucle-
ar and thermonuclear energy, the electronic conversion of energy to
work, and the use of cybernetics and computers to free human en-
ergy from routine decision-making. By 1980, the industrial world
will be as different from today's as today is different from the 19th
century.2 87
Could it be that the coming of the third industrial revolution has
caused America once more to call forth its ruthless men of force-this
generation's Knightian tycoons-to conquer the new frontiers? My intu-
ition is that this is at least partially the case. The imperatives of the third
industrial revolution cry out for Schumpeterian creative destruction. As
always, established elites resist. It is only by the exercise of the entre-
preneurial CEO's will that creative destruction can take place.
Whatever the reason for our return to laissez-faire sentiments and
policies, the new ideology has permeated the modern corporation to the
core. Pecuniary compensation, so subdued as a motivational strategy in
the Galbraithian era, is now central to the sense of accomplishment and
282. Id. at 241-42.
283. ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 318-24.
284. Id. at 306-07.
285. Id. at 322-23.
286. Id. at 316-19.
287. Berle, supra note 33, at 7.
288. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 80-86 (1942)
("This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.").
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worth for all members of the technocracy. The natural consequence is a
lessened sense of identity with the goals of the firm and a lessened sense
of solidarity among members of the technocracy. For the CEO, howev-
er, there may be a heightened sense of satisfaction from the ability to
adapt the firm to the CEO's goals. Additionally, for the CEO and entre-
preneurial members of the technocracy, there may be an enhanced sense
of identification that comes from participating in the Darwinian struggle
for corporate power and business success-the modern version of what
Frank Knight called "the biggest and most fascinating game yet invent-
ed."289
Admittedly, the last decade has seen changes that could be inter-
preted as enhancing shareholder power at the expense of CEO power.
My intuition, however, is to the contrary.290 It is important to differenti-
ate between the office of the CEO and the man or woman who holds that
office. Job tenure may be less secure for the modern-era CEO, but the
actual powers of the office do not seem diminished. Moreover, job secu-
rity is anathema to the motivational scheme that seems to drive the true
Knightian entrepreneur. The ultimate motivation may be to play the
greatest game on earth, win or lose. The greatest game requires the pos-
sibility of losing. So making the playing field more difficult to maneuver
is not necessarily a negative for the ruthless men of force who are drawn
to the CEO role.
Time will tell how the modern corporation actually evolves and
whether CEO power rises or falls. How history plays out in this regard
will be part of the answer to much larger questions. Will Giovanni
Arrighi prove correct in his intuition that we are now in a period of tran-
sition between American hegemony and a still only dimly understood re-
placement system?29 1 Will American society fall prey to the pitfalls of
hyper-efficiency warned of by Joseph Schumpeter? 2" Or, instead, right-
ing itself and following the path described by Daron Acemoglu and
James Robinson in Why Nations Fail, will the United States once again
289. KNIGHT, supra note 69, at 360; see also supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
290. Recent changes in corporate governance rules may on the whole enhance CEO power.
Many of the shareholder protective provisions of recent federal legislation greatly increase the respon-
sibility and stress felt by outside directors while imposing no additional stress on the CEO. Other pro-
visions, like the certification requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation actually enhance the
CEO's power. Finally, while directors are now required to "ratify" and "oversee" CEO actions with
much more regularity and intensity, in Galbraithian terms, such ratification and oversight does not
make the directors the actual decision makers. The directors cannot replicate the knowledge and skills
possessed by the technocracy; thus, any effort by the board to interfere in the technocracy's decision
making would be counterproductive.
291. ARRIGHI, supra note 22, at 322-24.
292. [S]ince we are dealing with a process whose every element takes considerable time in re-
vealing its true features and ultimate effects, there is no point in appraising the performance of
that process ex visu of a given point of time; we must judge its performance over time, as it un-
folds through decades or centuries. A system-any system, economic or other-that at every giv-
en point of time fully utilizes its possibilities to the best advantage may yet in the long run be infe-
rior to a system that does so at no given point of time, because the latter's failure to do so may be
a condition for the level or speed of long-run performance.
SCHUMPETER, supra note 288, at 83.
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assume the mantle of world hegemon?2 93 Trying to understand the "pre-
sent history" of corporate governance reform in this larger context
strikes me as an essential part of our work as we follow in the footsteps
of Berle and Galbraith, who so powerfully illuminated the past while liv-
ing it.
293. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMEs A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER,
PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 368-403 (2012) (arguing that nations prosper when they have inclusive
economic institutions, and encourage creative destruction; to the contrary, nations fail when they
adopt extractive economic institutions that protect existing elites and discourage innovation).
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